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Preface
In their 1963 paper “The structure of a semantic theory”, Jerrold Katz and Jerry
Fodor argued that a characterisation of the abstract form of a semantic theory
is given by a meta-theory that answers questions such as What is the domain of
a semantic theory? What are the descriptive and explanatory goals of a semantic
theory? What mechanisms are employed in pursuit of these goals? What are the
empirical and methodological constraints upon a semantic theory? Even though
the Katz and Fodor paper was an early attempt to develop a semantic theory that
would be compatible with a Chomskyan syntax, their introductory comments
are applicable to semantic theories in general. That is, in order to be taken seri-
ously, any semantic theory must be able to answer such meta-theoretical ques-
tions. Moreover, the extent to which competing semantic theories give similar
answers to these questions is the extent to which such theories can be compared,
for different answers will result in different explanatory aims and perhaps in in-
commensurable domains of inquiry. In regard to linguistic science and the way
in which linguists think andwork, sorting out what the domain of a semantic the-
ory is and what explanatory goals it has are paramount in assessing the success
or otherwise of the theory.
This book discusses the twomain construals of the explanatory goals of seman-
tic theories. These two construals, I argue below, are not so much in opposition
as they are orthogonal. The first understands semantic theories in terms of an
interpretive (or hermeneutic) explanatory project, this is often referred to in phi-
losophy of language as externalism. As I detail in the second half of the book,
this construal sees the task of a semantic theory as specifying how expressions
are to be interpreted. For example, in their two volume study of truth-theoretic
semantics, Lepore and Ludwig remark that “there is no question of a standpoint
for understanding meaning that is outside of language altogether.” That is, they
argue that “the most fundamental and powerful devices for representation can
obviously not be explicated without the use of just those devices. We can then
at best show how they work by showing how they systematically contribute to
how we understand sentences in which they appear” (Lepore & Ludwig 2007: 9).
This construal, often implicit, is the standard one in philosophy and in formal
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semantics, but it is far from being the only one.
The second construal understands semantic theories in terms of the internalist
study of the psychological mechanisms in virtue of which meaning production
and comprehension are made possible. There is a sense in which there is no
competition between the internalist and externalist understanding of semantics,
for each approach asks different questions and has different explanatory aims.
Unfortunately, this is not the way in which the debate has often been couched,
for it is often assumed that both sides are engaged in the same research project.
This has led to much misunderstanding and ill-founded criticism from both sides.
The internalist side is often criticised for not doing semantics in the way in which
the externalist and hermeneutic side assumes semantics should be done. In other
words, psychological theories of semantics are often criticised for eschewing the
interpretive aspects of semantics that form the basis of the hermeneutic approach
to meaning. But these critics fail to see the force and difference in the internalist
approach. Regardless of what one thinks of the internalist approach to semantics,
its explanatory project both in theory and practice is not hermeneutic but rather
scientific in the sense to be spelled out below.
This book argues that a fruitful scientific explanation is one that aims to un-
cover the underlying mechanisms in virtue of which the observable phenomena
are made possible, and that a scientific semantics should be doing just that. I
should note at the outset that nothing follows about approaches that are not sci-
entific in this particular sense. There is clearly a great deal to learn from the
hermeneutic approach and much good work has been done that takes this ap-
proach, but we should not confuse ourselves by claiming that this approach is
scientific. Another way to put the matter is as follows. Until recently (perhaps
until the mid twentieth century) it was not possible to do semantics qua science,
and so it was done in a hermeneutic fashion with much success and offering
many insights into the nature of language and mind. However, if (as I detail in
chapter 4) we understand scientific explanations to be unearthing the underly-
ing mechanisms in virtue of which the observable phenomena are made possible,
then the hermeneutic approach does not offer scientific explanations (and most
of its practitioners do not claim to be doing so). The externalist project is one that
often aims to provide meta-linguistic semantic descriptions that are essentially
interpretive and hermeneutic. Nothing follows about the validity or fecundity of
this hermeneutic approach by showing that it is not scientific, except clarifying
that it does not aim to unearth the psychological mechanisms in virtue of which
meaning comprehension and production are made possible. Showing that this is
the case is important in the context of any field that studies meaning, whether it
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be linguistics, philosophy, psychology, or cognitive science. To see why this is
the case, let me offer a few remarks about the current status of semantics, both
within linguistics and in other fields that study the phenomenon of meaningful-
ness.
The introduction to the recent Routledge Handbook of Semantics is titled “Se-
mantics – a theory in search of an object”. The editor of the handbook argues that
current linguistic semantics is “a subfieldwhose object –meaning and reference –
could hardly bemore ambiguous or protean, andwhich is studied by a highly var-
ious scatter of often incompatible theoretical approaches, each of which makes
truth-claims, at least implicitly, in favour of its own kind of analysis” (Riemer
2015: 1). The editor of the handbook is also the author of a semantics textbook
in which he notes that there is a “lack of disciplinary agreement over the basic
theoretical questions” at the core of semantics (Riemer 2010: xiii). Such a diagno-
sis (and indeed philosophical self reflection of this kind) is rare in linguistics, yet
it is accurate, and Riemer remarks that due to this theoretical heterogeneity “it
is no surprise that consensus is almost wholly absent about any of the key ques-
tions semantics sets out to answer”. These questions include, “what meaning as
an object of study might, in detail, amount to; how it – whatever ‘it’ is – should
be theoretically approached; how – even pretheoretically – it should be charac-
terized on the level of individual expressions, constructions, and utterances; and
what relation semantics should entertain with other fields of enquiry within and
outside linguistics” (Riemer 2015: 1-2). Indeed, as Riemer remarks, “it’s striking
how little explicit theory-evaluation is undertaken by semantics researchers, and
how rarely theoretical bridges between different research programmes are even
sought, let alone found” (Riemer 2015: 2). This lack of explicit theory evaluation
is a primary reason for the lack of consensus on fundamental linguistic phenom-
ena. This is a major hurdle faced by linguistic semantics, and the fact that it is
rarely noticed or acknowledged calls for a remedy.
This book aims to provide the beginning of such a remedy by discussing the
two major construals of the nature of meaning. By investigating the debate be-
tween internalist semanticists and those who advocate for a hermeneutic and
interpretive semantics, I hope to clarify the theoretical landscape and provide a
rigorous characterisation of what meaning is according to these two schools of
thought. I should note that, historically and to this day, linguistics has attracted
the interest of many philosophers of language that seek to understand the nature
of meaning. However, as Riemer and others have noted, this interest has not been
reciprocated. Too few linguists have investigated the philosophical approach to
meaning or compared their own semantic theories to those offered by philoso-
ix
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phers. This is unfortunate, for the divide between philosophy and linguistics is
artificial. In the same way as people working on the nature of time or the inter-
pretation of quantum physics are often in philosophy (and not physics) depart-
ments, there are people working on the nature of meaning that are in philosophy
(and not in linguistics) departments (or they may be in psychology, literature,
anthropology, or sociology departments). Linguists, then, and semanticists in
particular, have as much to learn from philosophers of language as philosophers
of language have to learn from linguists. But again, this divide is artificial.
This book compares the internalist and externalist approach to semantics, de-
scribing their different motivations and theoretical assumptions. I do this from
the point of view of explanatory scientific theories. This is an important issue
to sort out, for the way in which we construe the nature of meaning is essential
for a fecund explanatory language science. I argue that a science of semantics
is unlikely to be an externalist one, for reasons having to do with the subject
matter and form of externalist and hermeneutic theories. Unlike the internalist
approach to semantics, the externalist approach is not usually discussed in terms
of scientific explanations, and so my argument might be open to the charge that
externalists do not see their enterprise as scientific and thus it is a moot point
to compare them to other scientific pursuits. However, as will become evident,
there are leading externalists and formal semanticists who explicitly state that
their theory is a scientific one. Thus, it is both possible and illuminating to look
at the externalist research program from the perspective of scientific explanatory
strategies and to ask whether it is a promising avenue in regard to constructing
an explanatory scientific theory.
I argue that externalist explanations of meaning are concerned with ascrip-
tion and description of meaning rather than the mechanisms of meaning. That
is, externalism is not concerned with the mental mechanisms in virtue of which
humans produce and comprehend meaning. Therefore, it is not part of the psy-
chological explanation of the mechanisms in virtue of which meaning is made
possible. Rather, externalist explanations are a hermeneutic explanatory project
in that they are an inherently interpretive project. Works in favour of the inter-
nalist approach are currently in the minority, and thus this book also meets the
need of describing and helping in advancing a particular understanding of mean-
ing that has been used in the philosophical and linguistics literature for a long
time. I provide a critical examination of externalism and present the internalist
alternative that, I argue, is better placed to provide the foundation upon which
to build a fruitful explanatory science of semantics.
Lastly, I should note that in addition to discussing recent debates, I will also be
x
discussing many of the classic references in the field because the latter still repre-
sent mainstream positions in the discipline. Much can be learned by considering
the classic references in light of current debates.
xi

1 Clarifications and methodological
preliminaries
The problem of intentionality is the problem of how some entities can be “about”
something. That is, words and sentences, among others, display intentionality in
that they are about something else; they are said to be a representation of some-
thing. The notion of intentionality can be traced back at least as far as Aristotle,
though the German philosopher Franz Brentano is generally credited with intro-
ducing the notion to contemporary philosophy in the late nineteenth century.
Brentano’s oft-quoted remark is that “[e]very mental phenomenon is character-
ized by […] the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object” and “reference
to a content, direction toward an object.” In other words, “[e]very mental phe-
nomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do
so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement some-
thing is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and
so on” (Brentano 1995 [1874]: 68). The usual way to frame the problem of inten-
tionality is in terms of meaning or content. What is the status of the meaning of
a sentence over and above its syntactic aspects? What makes it the case that a
particular proposition has the content that it does? Is meaning only dependent
upon mind-internal properties? Or must we make use of mind-external factors
such as the context of the utterance or the speaker’s social history in order to
determine the meaning?
Those who argue that the relevant and scientifically interesting properties that
are involved in meaning are overwhelmingly, though not entirely, within the
mind are referred to as internalists. On the other hand, externalists argue that
there is something more to meaning than purely mind-internal events and their
happenstance connection to the world: externalists insist that the meanings of
our words (or sentences, or the contents of our thoughts, etc.) depend on some
deep metaphysical (perhaps causal) connection between the mind and objects in
the world that are independent of the mind. Externalists argue that a semantic
theory needs to provide an account of the relation between linguistic expres-
sions and things in the world (Cann 1993). In other words, the claim is that
in order to explain meaning we must provide an account of the purported for-
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mal/causal/metaphysical relation between linguistic expressions and the things
that they can be used to talk about.
The externalist position has become a widely held position in the philosophy
of language. The classic arguments for externalism are found in Putnam (1975),
Burge (1979; 1986), and Kripke (1980). Broadly speaking, externalist theories take
a model theoretic approach to semantics. They model the interpretation of natu-
ral language sentences by making use of set theoretic structures and truth con-
ditions. According to such theories, understanding a sentence involves at least
in part the grasping of its truth conditions. This approach is not limited to phi-
losophy of language, for there is a great deal of work in linguistics, for example
in formal semantics (Heim & Kratzer 1998; Portner 2005) and formal pragmatics
(Kadmon 2001), that takes the truth conditional approach. For example, in his for-
mal semantics textbook, Portner (2005: 11, 13) argues that “meanings are not inter-
nal to language, are not in the mind, and are not merely social practices. Rather,
they are based in language- and mind-external reality.” Moreover, “knowledge
of meaning involves (at least) the knowledge of the conditions under which a
sentence is true”. In other words, “all there is to the meaning of a sentence is
its truth-conditions”. It should thus be clear at the outset that philosophers and
linguists take the externalist understanding of meaning seriously both in theory
and in practice. Moreover, just like the externalist philosophers discussed in this
book, some linguists also aim “to approach meaning as scientists” (Portner 2005:
4) and not, presumably, as members of the project that construes meaning in a
hermeneutic or interpretive fashion.
Putnam argues that “a better philosophy and a better science of language”
must encompass the “social dimension of cognition” and the “contribution of
the environment, other people, and the world” to semantics (Putnam 1975: 193).
His Twin Earth thought experiment is the most famous argument in favour of
externalism; it claims to show that two subjects can have identical internal psy-
chological mental states but that the content of these states can be different due
to particular variations in the environment. Putnam asks us to imagine a world
(Twin-Earth) in which water is not composed of H2O like it is on our world but
is rather composed of XYZ. When a person (call him Oscar) says water on Earth
the word refers to H2O, but when a different person (call him Twin-Oscar) says
water in a different place (on Twin-Earth) the word refers to XYZ. This seems
intuitively clear; the word water refers to what the word is about in that par-
ticular environment (so when Oscar utters water that word is about H2O in his
environment). Putnam asks what would happen if Oscar is transported to Twin-
Earth. Would the word water uttered by Oscar on Twin-Earth now refer to H2O
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or XYZ? Notice that the thought experiment legislates that the only change that
takes place when Oscar is transported from Earth to Twin-Earth is the change
in his environment (i.e., all of his psychological states remain unchanged). Now,
Putnam reasons that if knowing the meaning of a term is just a matter of being in
a certain psychological state, then water on Twin-Earth when uttered by Oscar
should refer to H2O and not to XYZ as we might expect. This is because Oscar’s
psychological state was fixed on Earth, and if the psychological state fixes the
reference then water refers to H2O regardless of the environment the subject is
in.
Another way to put the matter is as follows: when Twin-Oscar on Twin-Earth
says water whilst pointing to a lake that is entirely composed of XYZ, as all
watery things are composed of on Twin-Earth, water refers to XYZ and not to
H2O. But, Putnam’s argument claims, if knowing the meaning of a term is just
a matter of being in a certain psychological state then water uttered on Twin-
Earth by Oscar transported from Earth cannot mean XYZ and must mean H2O.
Something seems to bewrong here. If two people utter the sameword in the same
environment we expect that word to refer to the same thing. Thus, if we want
to hold on to the claim that the meaning of a term determines its reference or
extension then, the argument claims, we must concede that, as Putnam famously
put it, “[c]ut the pie any way you like, ‘meanings’ just ain’t in the head!” (Putnam
1975: 144). That is, the claim here is that mind-internal properties on their own
cannot fix the meanings of words or what their reference is. Note again that
for Putnam and others such claims are made within the realm of a science of
language. They are claims about the nature of meaning in the mind that they see
as having direct bearing on the psychology of meaning.
One might conclude that externalism has to be right, for how could mean-
ing not depend on the outside world? Surely the meaning of the word elephant
cannot be due to only mind-internal properties. The word is about elephants, it
could be argued, which are in the mind-external world, not inside the mind. As
we will see, however, internalists argue that there are good reasons to question
the externalist claim that meanings are connected to the world in the way in
which externalists claim they are. In other words, internalism does not deny the
link to the outside world but rather has a different explanation of how our mind
generates and interprets semantic content. Internalism argues that, for the pur-
poses of scientific inquiry into language and mind, the internal properties of the
human mind are the most relevant and fruitful subject matter. Thus construed,
internalism is not so much a solution to the issues that externalists grapple with.
Rather, as I detail in the forthcoming chapters, internalism is a different research
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program. There is a difference in the sorts of questions that externalists and in-
ternalists attempt to answer. This is important to stress at the outset, for there
has been a great deal of misunderstanding due to terminological choices. This
is because the label internalism has been used to refer to several different and
opposing research programs.
In the remainder of this chapter, then, I show that the research project that
surrounds the debate between individualism and anti-individualism or external-
ism is separate to the research project of internalism. Too often individualism
and internalism are used interchangeably, but the way in which internalists in
linguistics and the philosophy of language (such asNoamChomsky and Paul Piet-
roski) understand and practice their research project is very different from that
of individualism. I don’t want to engage in a terminological dispute about what
internalismmeans or should mean, rather I want to describe and thus help in pre-
serving a particular understanding of internalism (and of meaning) that has been
used in the literature for a long time and has provided interesting and valuable
insights into the nature of language and mind. Individualism, anti-individualism
and externalism are each concerned with the criteria for the ascription of mean-
ing, whereas internalism is concerned with the underlying generative mecha-
nisms of meaning.
Burge (1986: 3-4) defines individualism as “a view about how kinds are cor-
rectly individuated, how their natures are fixed.” According to individualism
about the mind, then, “the mental natures of all a person’s or animal’s mental
states (and events) are such that there is no necessary or deep individuative re-
lationship between the individual’s being in states of those kinds and the nature
of the individual’s physical or social environments.” Individualism is concerned
with attribution, with the proper labels that should be assigned to particular men-
tal states. In the case of language, the individualist (and the anti-individualist or
externalist) project is part of the approach that aims to provide meta-linguistic
semantic descriptions of the linguistic usage of speakers in particular contexts.
Internalism, on the other hand, is concerned with the underlying mechanisms in
virtue of which language use is made possible. Anti-individualism or external-
ism argues that there is a deep individuative relationship between mental states
and the environment, but this is not a claim about the underlying psychological
mechanisms of language but rather about how to interpret particular utterances
given their context of use.
Wikforss (2008) argues that externalism is “the thesis that meaning (and con-
tent) fails to supervene on internal facts.” In other words, “[f]or all natural kind
terms T, and all meanings M, the totality of facts that determine that T expresses
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M include external facts” (Wikforss 2008: 161). Wikforss then remarks that “in-
ternalism, by contrast, is the thesis that the determination basis includes only
internal facts.” However, the main force and substance of the internalist position
discussed in this book is not a mirror image or a negation of the externalist or
anti-individualist position. That is, internalism is not concerned with how we
determine (qua speakers) what the meaning of a particular utterance is. A for-
tiori, it does not claim that the determination basis of utterances includes only
internal facts. Internalists are skeptical that there is a deep metaphysical relation
between the “things in the world” and linguistic expressions, and they dispute
the externalist contention that the relations between linguistic expressions and
the “things in the world” are desirable or even tractable in a scientific theory of
language. The literature in the philosophy of language that discusses individu-
alism is immersed in debates about the correct attribution of semantic content
to utterances given a particular context of language use; indeed, this question
is the focal point of the individualism/anti-individualism debate. But whatever
the merit and explanatory force of the search for the correct attribution condi-
tions, it is clearly separate to internalism. Note again the parallel with linguistics:
semanticists also aim to uncover the correct criteria for the attribution of seman-
tic content. But this is not the only way in which to do semantics. Indeed, as
detailed in this book, the internalist semantics of biolinguistics has a different
understanding of the aims of a semantic theory.
Burge (2003) remarks that even though he at times uses the term internalism,
he prefers to use the term individualism. He admits that some of Chomsky’s “ar-
guments for ‘internalism’ do not directly connect with my objections to the view
I designate with the term ‘individualism.’ So some apparent disagreement may
not be real” (Burge 2003: 453). Indeed, for Chomsky’s internalism is not the same
as individualism. Burge is explicit about this: “Internalism, inmy sense, concerns
not the locus of the psychological states, or the best ways to study them, but
whether being in them presupposes individual-environmental relations. It con-
cerns whether the existence and nature of certain psychological kinds depends
necessarily on the existence and nature of certain relations to specific kinds or
situations in the environment” (Burge 2003: 454, emphasis in original). As we
will see below, however, despite Burge’s explicit distinction between his sense
of internalism (individualism) and Chomsky’s internalism, the conflation of the
two continues.
Let us now briefly rehearse a classic argument about the individuation ofmean-
ing in order to detail and clarify the thesis of individualism and to separate it from
internalism as understood in this book. This is important to sort out because too
5
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often internalism is dismissed as being another species of individualism; but it
is far from that and in fact offers genuine insights into the nature of meaning in
natural language. Moreover, this discussion shows that the concerns of philoso-
phers of language often overlap with the concerns of linguists. The two camps
may use different terminology and they may have little contact with each other,
but it is clear that they are often involved in the same research program with
similar theoretical working assumptions.
Burge (1979) argues against individualism by stressing the necessity of the
inclusion of mind-external factors in the descriptions of an individual’s men-
tal states. Burge’s anti-individualist argument revolves around a Twin-Earth
thought experiment in which a person is said to have a large number of proposi-
tional attitudeswith the content of arthritis. So, for example, this person correctly
thinks that he has had arthritis for years, or that stiffening joints is a symptom
of arthritis. In addition to these attitudes, Burge’s thought experiment contin-
ues, the person falsely believes that he has developed arthritis in his thigh: this
is impossible by definition, as the person is informed by his doctor, since the
speech community does not use the term arthritis to apply to ailments outside of
the joints. Next is the counterfactual supposition of the thought experiment in
which we are asked to imagine a second person whose life has proceeded from
birth through an identical course of physical events, right to and including the
time at which the first person initially reports his fear that he has arthritis in his
thigh to his doctor. The only difference that is postulated to exist between the
two people is that the latter’s community of physicians and informed laymen
apply the term arthritis not only to arthritis but to various other rheumatoid
ailments.
So in the first case, the person falsely believes that he has arthritis in his thigh.
Whereas in the second case, the person correctly believes that he has arthritis
in his thigh. Burge concludes that the “upshot of these reflections is that the
patient’s mental contents differ while his entire physical and non-intentional
mental histories, considered in isolation from their social context, remain the
same”, and the “differences seem to stem from differences ‘outside’ the patient
considered as an isolated physical organism.” That is, the “difference in his men-
tal contents is attributable to difference in his social environment” (Burge 1979:
79). So the contents of one’s thoughts, according to Burge, are individuated by
and depend on the meaning of the terms as used in one’s linguistic community.
That is, “social factors may enter in complex ways into individual psychology
and the semantics of idiolects” (Burge 1989: 275). Burge argues that the correct
attribution of meaning is impossible without reference to the social context in
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which the individual uses that meaning. Burge is here concerned with the cri-
teria for semantic attribution, which is related to but independent of the study
of the underlying mechanisms that make the production and comprehension of
meaning possible. Michael Devitt makes a similar point when he argues that
“thoughts are one thing, their ascription another.” He believes that it is a mistake
for philosophers to “start with the theory of thought ascription, leaving the the-
ory of thought pretty much to look after itself” (Devitt 1984: 385). The upshot of
the difference between individualism and internalism is that one can search for
the correct criteria for the individuation of mental states (or for the correct way
in which to produce meta-linguistic semantic descriptions) without committing
to the nature of the mechanisms that underlie these mental states.
Incidentally, the amalgamation of internalism with a form of individualism
(thus excluding the semantic internalism discussed in this book) is not limited
to the externalist literature. Consider the internalist (individualist) accounts of
Segal (2000), Farkas (2008), Mendola (2008), and Georgalis (2015). These books
are perhaps the most notable of the so-called internalist accounts of meaning
of the last two decades, but revealingly none deal with internalism in the sense
discussed here. The work of Chomsky and others is barely mentioned let alone
discussed in sufficient depth (or at all). This is not meant as a criticism. They do
not do so because they deal with individualism, with matters of ascription, de-
scription, and truth-conditional semantics, and argue against anti-individualism
(externalism). Indeed, as Yli-Vakkuri & Hawthorne (2018: 63) remark in a recent
critical book on narrow content, “the most natural of our structural conditions”
is “nearly universally accepted by internalists.” This condition is “that narrow
content should be truth-conditional.” Chalmers (2003) also argues for this sort
of internalist content. And Farkas (2008: 184) concludes her book by remarking
that “[t]here is no need for the internalist to give up the idea that contents are
truth conditional.”
One might wonder whether internalists qua individualists also claim their ac-
count to be scientific like some leading externalists do. The answer is that some
do so, and so as far as their account is a variation of truth-theoretic semantics,
what I will have to say in regard to externalist theories of meaning will apply
to individualists too. Mendola (2008) argues that science can settle the debate
between internalism and externalism. He understands internalism to be a claim
about the content of, say beliefs and desires, and argues that the neuroscience
of vision and other sciences support his internalist position. But there is a prob-
lem with this strategy that Mendola (2008: 10) himself notices, but he draws the
wrong conclusion from it. He says that this strategy is even more popular on
7
1 Clarifications and methodological preliminaries
the other side, with externalists, and that for “every internalist who claims to be
deferring to cognitive science, there are two externalists who do the same.” The
problem is that, “even if we take our current cognitive science and psychology as
gospel, the deference-to-science strategy doesn’t work right now, for internalists
or externalists” because “it doesn’t now clearly cut one way or the other, or at
the very least there is no consensus on how it cuts.” But the reason for the lack of
consensus is not that science has not yet shown which side is the clear-cut win-
ner. Rather, the reason there is no consensus about whether science supports
internalism (individualism) or externalism (anti-individualism) is that science is
a different project altogether. The two projects can and should inform one an-
other, but they are distinct. To repeat, the notion of internalism understood as the
mirror image of externalism (that is, understood as rejecting anti-individualism
but still clinging to reference and content understood truth-conditionally) is very
different to the internalist position described in this book.
As noted above, externalism has become a widely held position that is espe-
cially popular within the philosophies of mind and language. Indeed, some feel
that “externalism has been so successful that the primary focus of today’s debate
is not so much on whether externalism is right or wrong, but rather on what its
implications are” (Wikforss 2008: 158), and that “[o]ver the past 30 years much
of the philosophical community has become persuaded of the truth of content
externalism“ (Majors & Sawyer 2005: 257). Externalism has thus become “almost
an orthodoxy in the philosophy of mind” (Farkas 2003: 187). Since the internal-
ist position is very much in the minority, it is necessary to begin by outlining
its conception of a semantic theory before it can be compared with the received
view of externalism. A clear understanding of this strand of internalism is essen-
tial, for not only is it a minority view but it is also widely misunderstood. After
comparing the two approaches to semantics, I will argue that internalism is sig-
nificantly more promising in regard to constructing an explanatory scientific the-
ory of meaning. Note again that what follows is that the externalist (hermeneutic
and interpretive) approach is a different research project to that of a semantics
construed scientifically, and so nothing follows about the validity or fecundity
of externalism construed hermeneutically.
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In this chapter I detail the internalist approach, which is taken by generative
linguistics as well as the broader, generative-oriented, biolinguistics program.
Language is here regarded as an internal computational system that produces a
set of hierarchically structured expressions that are employed by the systems of
thought and the sensorimotor systems to yield language production and compre-
hension. I discuss the work in internalist semantics of Paul Pietroski and others
according to which linguistic meanings are computational instructions to build
monadic concepts.
Internalism, as the name suggests, studies internal states, including those that
in philosophy are regarded as mental states. Chomsky (2003) makes clear that
internalism is not the doctrine that denies that mental states are individuated
by reference to the subject’s environment, nor is it the doctrine that holds that
subjects in the same internal states are therefore in the same mental states. That
is, as mentioned above, internalism is not the same as individualism. Rather,
internalism is “an explanatory strategy that makes the internal structure and
constitution of the organism a basis for the investigation of its external function
and the ways in which it is embedded in an environment” (Hinzen 2006: 139).
In other words, internalism “is primarily a conjecture about a proper object of the
scientific study of language (which internalists claim to be I-language)” (Lohndal
& Narita 2009: 324, emphasis in original). This chapter will outline what this
amounts to in the case of semantics.
2.1 E-language and I-language
Biolinguistics treats language as an internal computational system, a recursive
mechanism that produces a potentially infinite set of hierarchically structured ex-
pressions that are employed by the conceptual-intentional systems (systems of
thought) and the sensorimotor systems to yield language production and compre-
hension. As I detail below, this particular functional design of the language fac-
ulty is strongly shaped by its interface with the systems of thought, rather than
by the peripheral process of externalisation inherent in the link with the sensori-
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motor systems (Chomsky 2013; Hinzen 2013; Asoulin 2016; Berwick & Chomsky
2016). Biolinguistics takes its object of study to be the underlying mechanisms
of language, which are a subsystem of our cognitive system and are composed
of a computational system (called an I-language) that is encoded in individual
brains. The subject matter of biolinguistics (and internalism) is thus competence,
as opposed to performance. As Chomsky put it in an oft-quoted phrase, genera-
tive linguistics is primarily concerned with an ideal speaker/hearer who resides
in “a completely homogeneous speech-community, who knows its language per-
fectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory
limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random or
characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance”
(Chomsky 1965: 3). Competence, then, refers to the speaker/hearer’s knowledge
of his/her language, whereas performance refers to the actual use of this knowl-
edge by a particular person. The actual use of one’s linguistic knowledge in lan-
guage production and comprehension involves many other factors, only one of
which is one’s competence, and it is only under strict idealisation conditions
that performance might be seen as reflecting competence. Chomsky (1986) de-
veloped a different characterisation of the competence/performance distinction,
a clearer and more useful distinction that is still used today: I-Language versus
E-language.
Externalised (E-) language refers to the actual or potential speech events. From
the E-language point of view, a grammar is a collection of descriptive state-
ments concerning performance; the grammar describes or taxonomises the cor-
pus of linguistic performance data. This is the way language is studied in struc-
tural and descriptive linguistics, behavioural psychology, and some branches of
cognitive science, where language is viewed as a collection of linguistic forms
(words or sentences) that are paired with meanings. Even though this descrip-
tion glosses over the subtleties of and the differences between specific E-language
approaches, the main thread of them all is the view of language as “the totality of
utterances that can bemade in a speech community” (Bloomfield); or language as
“a pairing of sentences and meanings over an infinite range”, where the language
is used by a population when certain regularities hold among the population
with respect to the language and are sustained by an interest in communication
(Lewis).1 What the E-language approaches share is the view that language can be
understood (indeed often it is claimed that it exists) independently of the proper-
ties of themind/brain. That is, language is understood as a collection of actions or
behaviours, and “a grammar is a collection of descriptive statements concerning
1 See Chomsky (1986: 19) for discussion and more references.
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the E-language, the actual or potential speech events (perhaps along with some
account of their context of use or semantic content)” Chomsky (1986: 20).
In other words, this approach sees a grammar as a function that enumerates
the elements of the E-language. But this function need not be unique. From the
E-language perspective, there need not be one real or correct grammar that corre-
sponds to the corpus data: as long as it yields a correct description of the corpus
data, any number of grammars could in principle apply. Lewis, for example, says
that he can find no way to “make objective sense of the assertion that a gram-
mar Γ is used by population P whereas another grammar Γ0 which generates the
same language as Γ, is not” (Lewis 1975: 20). Lewis believes that a language is an
abstract, formal system that a population selects by convention (Lewis 1969). An-
other manifestation of E-language can be seen in Devitt & Sterelny (1989), who
argue that rather than being about competence, linguistics is about the properties
and relations of observable linguistic symbols (see also Devitt 2006). According
to the E-language conception, then, language is, as it were, out there, it is not
intimately related to the mind. Deacon, for example, argues that in contrast to
the claim of generative linguistics that support for language acquisition origi-
nates inside the brain (in the language faculty), “the extra support for language
learning is vested neither in the brain of the child nor in the brains of parents
or teachers, but outside brains, in language itself ” (Deacon 1997: 105, emphasis
mine). The E-language is the real object of study here, not the grammar which
generated it, which is a derivative notion because it is assumed that any grammar
is suitable so long as it correctly generates the observable corpus.
On the internalised (I-) language perspective, however, there is a particular
grammar that generates and is responsible for the observable corpus of utter-
ances. More precisely, it generates a set of structural descriptions that provide
the basis for interpretation. It is the generative grammar that is the object of
study (as opposed to the set generated by the grammar), and this grammar qua
generative computational device is instantiated in the brain. Language is thus
conceived as some real structure in the brain of the speaker/hearer that is respon-
sible for (indeed it is) the language that that speaker/hearer knows. So, unlike
the E-language conception of language, a generative grammar qua I-language is
a theory of a real mental structure to which “questions of truth and falsity arise
[…] as they do for any scientific theory” Chomsky (1986: 22). As we’ll see in de-
tail below, the I-language approach, which biolinguistics takes, sees the proper
subject matter of a scientific linguistics to be the knowledge a speaker/hearer has
of his or her language, the knowledge that underlies and makes possible, along
with other factors, that speaker/hearer’s language production and comprehen-
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sion. This is also the research program of internalism.
Let us be clear about the relation between the internalism/externalism distinc-
tion and the I-language/E-language distinction. Internalism in the sense under-
stood by the authors discussed in this book is clearly and explicitly rooted in the
I-language approach to semantics. The E-language approach, on the other hand,
is exemplified by several externalists that are cited in Chomsky (1986) where
the I-language/E-language distinction was first articulated. The labels I-language
and E-language, then, denote approaches to the study of language and meaning.
There is more than one way to flesh out an I-language or E-language approach to
semantics, and I discuss some of these variations below. I should also note that
there are other criticisms of the externalist position apart from those offered here
from the point of view of internalist semantics, so it of course does not follow that
one must agree with biolinguistics in order to see the problems with externalist
semantics of the Putnam or Davidson sort. For example, as discussed below, Paul
Horwich offers both a critique of externalist semantics and an alternative seman-
tic theory. But his theory still clings to an externalist (in the E-language sense)
understanding of meaning.
With that in mind, let us now explore the nature of I-language before moving
on to internalist semantics. An I-language is a computational system that is in
the mind of individual language users. It is a generative procedure that outputs
structural descriptions that provide the basis for interpretation. There is a stress
here on the intensional nature of particular I-languages, meaning that there is a
specific procedure encoded in themind that generates the structural descriptions;
this is in contrast to the extensional nature of E-language grammars. Another
way to put the matter is in terms of formal mathematics, in which a sequence
can be defined extensionally by listing its members, say 0; 1; 1; 2; 3; 5; 8; 13…, or
intensionally by providing a formula that generates themembers of the sequence,
say the formula Fn = F(n 1) + F(n 2) that generates all and only the numbers of
the Fibonacci sequence. An intensional definition is much more useful for large
sets and is essential for potentially infinite sets like the ones associated with
natural languages. This analogy should not be taken too literally, for as we’ll see
in chapter 3, there are crucial differences between formal languages and natural
languages.
The internal computational processes of the language faculty generate linguis-
tic objects that are employed by the conceptual-intentional systems (systems of
thought) and the sensorimotor systems. Lexical items, then, and all expressions
generated from them, must have properties that are interpretable at both these
interfaces. Notice that on this view the language faculty is embedded within, but
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separate from, the performance systems. So an I-language is a device that gen-
erates structured expressions of the form Exp =< Phon; Sem >, where Phon
provides the sound instructions of which the sensorimotor systems make use,
and Sem provides the meaning instructions of which the systems of thought
make use. Phon contains information relating to linear precedence, stress, tem-
poral order, prosodic and syllable structure, and other articulatory features. Sem
contains information relating to event and quantification structure, and certain
arrays of semantic features. The term instructions is here used in a technical
sense, so that to say that
[…] phonetic features are “instructions” to sensorimotor systems at the in-
terface is not to say that they have the form “Move the tongue in such-
and-such a way” or “Perform such-and-such analysis of signals.” Rather, it
expresses the hypothesis that the features provide information in the form
required for the sensorimotor systems to function in language-independent
ways. (Chomsky 2000a: 91)2
The same is true for the semantic features at the Sem interface, which are
not “instructions” to the conceptual-intentional systems of the form “this pro-
nounced word means such-and-such” or “link this pronounced phrase with this
concept”. Rather, as detailed in the next section, the Sem interface is part of the
procedure that generates instructions to build new mental representations.
The expression Exp is generated by the operation Merge, which takes objects
already constructed and constructs from them a new object. So, for example,
Merge(X;Y ) will yield the unordered set fX;Y g. The structure-building oper-
ation Merge follows the principle of Minimal Computation (compute and articu-
late as little as possible), for it is the simplest possible computational operation
for the task at hand (Berwick & Chomsky 2016; Chomsky 2016a). There are two
cases of Merge: External Merge refers to the operation where two syntactic ob-
jects are merged but where neither one is part of the other. Internal Merge, on
the other hand, refers to the operation where one of the syntactic objects is part
of the other. For example, Internal Merge takes place when a syntactic object is
combined with the set that contains it: so if Merge(X;Y ) yields Z = fX;Y g,
thenMerge(Z;X) yields fX;Y fXgg. For concreteness, take the following sim-
plified example of External Merge. The silver saucer broke yesterday is produced
by Merge as follows: lexical items are merged to (separately) create The, silver,
2 For more on the phonetic implementation of phonological features, see Halle (1983; 1995). See
Kenstowicz (1994); Hale & Reiss (2008); Volenec & Reiss (2020) for an overview of generative
phonology.
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and saucer. Then silver and saucer are merged to created the Noun Phrase (NP)
silver saucer. Then silver saucer is merged with the to create the NP the silver
saucer. Then that NP is combined with the Verb Phrase (VP) broke yesterday
(which was produced by Merge when lexical items were merged to create broke
and lexical items were merged to create yesterday, and then broke and yesterday
were merged together to create the VP broke yesterday).3
As for Internal Merge, suppose wemergedwhich saucer with John broke which
saucer to producewhich saucer John broke which saucer, which via further compu-
tations is then externalised aswhich saucer did John break. Before externalisation,
there are two copies of the same linguistic object (X): the original one and the dis-
placed one. They are both essential for interpretation. As Chomsky has remarked
in various places when he discusses Merge, this is an example of the ubiquitous
phenomenon of displacement in language, where phrases are heard in only one
place but are interpreted both there and in another place. So we interpret the
above sentence to mean “for which X, John broke the saucer X”. Merge, then,
defined as recursive set-formation, produces hierarchical structures and allows
for the unbounded embedding of these structures (namely, it allows for discrete
infinity).
There are independent reasons to believe that cognitive processes satisfy the
principle of Minimal Computation (see Cherniak 1994; Cherniak, Mokhtarzada
& Nodelman 2002), and since Merge satisfies this principle and is able to account
for the underlying mechanisms of language, we have strong grounds for its ex-
istence as a core computational principle of human language. Furthermore, as
Chomsky (2013) shows considering examples such as the abovewhere two copies
of which saucer are required for the interpretation of the sentence, Merge yields
structures suited for interpretation at the conceptual-intentional interface but
“these are clearly the wrong structures for the SM [sensorimotor] system: univer-
sally in language, only the structurally prominent copy is pronounced” (Chom-
sky 2013: 41). That is, the second copy must be deleted when it is transferred
to the sensorimotor interface resulting in articulated sentences having gaps that
create problems for language comprehension and communication but that are
necessary for interpretation at the conceptual-intentional interface. These are
the so-called filler-gap problems,4 where the hearer has to figure out where the
unarticulated element is in order to parse and interpret the sentence correctly.
There is thus an asymmetry between the interfaces in favour of the semantic side,
3 For recent discussion of Merge, see C. Collins (2017); Chomsky, Gallego & Ott (2019)
4 See Sprouse & Hornstein (2013) for a recent collection of work on long-distance filler-gap
dependencies.
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pushing externalisation (via Phon) to the periphery. If the language faculty is
structured in this way then it follows that the underlying computational mech-
anisms of language “will provide structures appropriate for semantic-pragmatic
interpretation but that yield difficulties for perception (hence communication)”
(Chomsky 2013: 41). In other words, the design of language favours minimal
computation, often at the expense of ease of communication (Sigurðsson 2004;
Burton-Roberts 2011; Asoulin 2016; 2020).
2.2 Internalist semantics
The expression Exp is of course not the same as a linguistic utterance but rather
provides the information required for the sensorimotor systems and the systems
of thought to function, largely in language-independent ways. Since these two
systems operate independently of (but at times in close interaction with) the fac-
ulty of language, a mapping to each interface is necessary, for these two systems
have different and often conflicting requirements. The systems of thought re-
quire a particular sort of hierarchical structure in order to, for example, calculate
relations such as scope; the sensorimotor systems, on the other hand, often re-
quire the elimination of this hierarchy because, for example, pronunciation must
take place serially. The instructions at the Sem interface that are interpreted by
the performance systems are used in acts of talking and thinking about the world
– in, say, reasoning or organising action. Linguistic expressions, then, provide
a perspective (in the form of a conceptual structure) on the world, for it is only
via language that certain perspectives are available to us and to our thought pro-
cesses. This is in line with a long rationalist tradition in the philosophy of lan-
guage and linguistics (Chomsky 1966), most famously articulated by Humboldt
in the nineteenth century, according to which language provides humans with
a Weltansicht or worldview that allows us to form the concepts with which we
think certain kinds of thought (but, crucially, not all kinds of thought: for we
share many kinds of thought processes with animals that do not have language).
In his recent study of Humboldt, Underhill (2009) remarks that Humboldt’s
“rich and dynamicmodel of language” is one “in which the individual both shapes
and is shaped by the organ of speech” (Underhill 2009: xi, emphasis in original).
The worldview concept of Weltansicht, which forms the cornerstone of Hum-
boldt’s linguistic philosophy, is understood as “the configuration of concepts
which allow conceptual thought” of a certain kind (Underhill 2009: 56). Lan-
guage is an instrument of thought in this sense (Asoulin 2016), but note that this
is not a Whorfian claim of linguistic determinism, for thought is certainly inde-
15
2 Internalism
pendent of particular natural languages, andwhat can be expressed or thought by
a speaker of one language can certainly be expressed or thought by a speaker of
a very different language. As Underhill (2009: 57) remarks, Whorfian claims are
merely “weak echoes of Humboldt’s voice”. Language provides us with a unique
way of thinking and talking about the world that is unavailable to non-linguistic
animals. Though of course animals have thoughts of many kinds (many of which
are shared with humans), but since they lack the language faculty there is a spe-
cific kind of thought that they lack (Hinzen 2013; Asoulin 2019). Let us see how
this rationalist understanding of the role of language in cognition is manifested
in current biolinguistics and internalist semantics.
As mentioned, an I-language is a device that generates structured expressions
of the form Exp =< Phon; Sem > with a double interface property: they have
phonological and semantic features through which the linguistic computations
can interact with other cognitive systems. But the link to and influence of each
interface is not symmetrical, for there is mounting evidence that there is an asym-
metry between the interfaces in favour of the semantic side, pushing external-
isation via Phon to the periphery (Chomsky 2013; Berwick & Chomsky 2016;
Chomsky 2016a; Asoulin 2016; 2020). Merge implements the basic properties of
I-language (Chomsky, Gallego & Ott 2019). Collins & Stabler (2016) show that all
the essential syntactic operations, such as c-command, can be formally defined
in terms of Merge. For reasons of computational efficiency, the computations
of Merge should apply freely so that the only constraints imposed on them are
those derived from the interfaces with the external systems. There are indepen-
dent reasons to believe that cognitive processes satisfy this principle of Minimal
Computation (Cherniak 1994; Cherniak, Mokhtarzada & Nodelman 2002; Chom-
sky 2016a). Investigation of the structures generated by Merge shows that they
are well suited to the Sem interface (hence, for internal thought), but cause pre-
dictable problems at the Phon interface. In other words, the normal course of
the derivation generated by Merge simply proceeds towards Sem, then at some
point in the derivation some parts of the expression are sent toPhon for external-
isation. The ‘point’ of the derivation is the generation of interpretable structures:
its externalisation via sound or sign is secondary at best.
The Sem interface is the way in which biolinguistics and internalism explain
meaning in natural language. A theory of Sem must satisfy three basic condi-
tions of adequacy, so that in order to capture what the language faculty deter-
mines about the meaning of an expression, Sem must “be universal, in that any
thought expressible in a human language is representable in it; an interface, in
that these representations have an interpretation in terms of other systems of
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the mind/brain involved in thought, referring, planning, and so on; and uniform”
(Chomsky 1995: 21). Semmust be uniform “for all languages, so as to capture all
and only the properties of the system of language as such” (Chomsky 1995: 21). In
other words, the way inwhich themeanings atSem are generated (and then sent
to the conceptual-intentional interface) is uniform in the sense that any meaning
generated via the language faculty is expressible in any natural language. Note
the stress on all and only the properties of the system of language: the language
faculty allows humans to use available concepts (some of which are shared with
other animals) to generate formally new concepts. The claim is not that Sem is
the interface of all conceptual content or of all of thought.
Pietroski (2008; 2010; 2018) has developed one of the most interesting and
detailed accounts of an internalist semantics, the leading idea of which is that “in
the course of language acquisition, humans use available concepts to introduce
formally new concepts that can be fetched via lexical items and combined via
certain operations that are invoked by the human faculty of language” (Pietroski
2010: 247, emphasis in original). That is, meanings are (internal, and unconscious)
instructions for how to access and assemble concepts of a special sort. Meaning is
here understood not in an extensional sense but rather in terms of the cognitive
resources (the computational procedures) that humans deploy in generating the
meanings. So, for example, the Sem of white sheep is an instruction to fetch a
concept from each lexical address and then conjoin them. There are a number
of steps and notions here that require unpacking: (i) what is a concept, (ii) how
is a concept lexicalised, and (iii) how are these lexicalised concepts conjoined. I
discuss each in turn below.
Concepts are, roughly, constituents of mental states. To give Fodor’s favourite
example, believing that cats are animals is a paradigmatic mental state, and the
concept animal is a constituent of the belief that cats are animals. The latter is a
proposition, and propositions are generally understood to be structured objects
of which concepts are the constituents. As Fodor has discussed in his various
works on concepts (for example, Fodor 1998; 2003; Fodor & Pylyshyn 2015; see
Murphy 2002 for an overview), some concepts are structured and some are prim-
itive. So the concept white cat is a structured concept that might include the two
primitive concepts white and cat. The meaning of a structured concept depends
on its primitive elements and on theway inwhich they are combined. But not any
combination is possible: there is a syntax that determines how concepts can (and
cannot) be combined. Frege’s famous metaphor of saturating concepts is helpful
here. Statements can be thought of in the same way as mathematical equations,
argued Frege (1980 [1892]), in that they are split into two parts (a function and an
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argument). Consider the sentence Caesar conquered Gaul. The first part (Caesar)
is the subject expression, which can stand on its own, but the second part (con-
quered Gaul), which is the predicate expression, is in need of supplementation
or saturation for it contains an empty place that needs to be filled in. So a proper
name like Caesar is said to saturate the function conquered Gaul by filling in the
empty place, giving a complete sense.
As Pietroski (2010: 249) discusses, singular concepts can saturate concepts like
arrived(x) and saw(x, y), which are used to classify and relate represented indi-
viduals, allowing humans to form sentential representations like arrived(Brutus)
and saw(Brutus, Caesar). Abstracting away from completed concepts leaves
what Pietroski calls a sentence frame “that can be described as an unsaturated
conceptwhose adicity is the number of saturable positions: arrived(x) ismonadic,
saw(x, y) is dyadic, give(x, y, z) is triadic, etc.” (Pietroski 2010: 249). There is of
course a limit to the saturable positions that natural language concepts can pos-
sess, and Pietroski argues that tetradic concepts may be common (compare the
difference between selling and giving). As he puts it, “we seem to have higher-
order numeric/set-theoretic/quantificational concepts that can be saturated by
monadic concepts, as in three/include/most[brown(x), cow(x)]. In short, con-
cepts compose and exhibit a limited hierarchy of types” (Pietroski 2010: 249).
Now, as Fodor (1975) famously argued, there are parallels between proposi-
tions and sentences and between words and concepts (and thus between thought
and language). That is, “propositions are what (declarative) sentences express,
and (excepting idioms, metaphors, and the like), which proposition a sentence
expresses is determined by its syntax and its inventory of constituents” (Fodor &
Pylyshyn 2015: 8, emphasis in original). But how far do these parallels go? How
much of conceptual thought is influenced, constructed, or determined by the
computational procedures of I-language? If our concepts are parallel to linguis-
tic expressions in their systematicity and productivity, how did these concepts
emerge? There is perhaps a spectrum of answers to these questions, but in gen-
eral there are two answers: either the concepts were there prior to lexicalisation
or else the process of lexicalisation introduced new sets (or new types) of con-
cepts. The biolinguistic and internalist semantics claim is of the latter sort. To
put the matter in Pietroski’s terms, already existing concepts (many of which
we share with other animals) are lexicalised and in the process distinctively new
concepts are produced that we are then able to combine to form linguistic expres-
sions. This process of lexicalisation and concatenation is part of the explanation
of the creative aspect of language use (Chomsky 1966; McGilvray 2001; 2005;
Asoulin 2013).
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So how is a concept lexicalised? There are several ways in which to flesh out
the idea that lexicalisation is the process by which pre-existing concepts are used
to introduce formally new concepts. The externalist answer, which will be dis-
cussed in the next chapter, is a compositional theory of meaning modelled on
the work of Davidson (1967; 1973) and Montague (1974); but let us continue with
an internalist answer. Pietroski’s answer moves away from the Fregean idea
that combining expressions is an instruction to saturate a concept and towards
a Conjunctivist account of linguistic composition (Hornstein & Pietroski 2009;
Pietroski 2018). According to the latter account, lexicalisation is not a process
in which a previously available concept is merely labelled using a lexical item
that inherits its content from the concept itself. Rather lexicalisation is a device
for accessing previously available concepts which become lexical items that are
used as input to I-language operations that combine the lexical items in specific
ways to introduce new formally distinct concepts. Accordingly, the Sem of any
expressionExp =< Phon; Sem > is not a concept that is paired with a pronun-
ciation. Indeed, as Pietroski puts it, “evaluating SEMs as if they were concepts
may be a category mistake, like evaluating an instruction to fetch a rabbit as male
or female” (Pietroski 2010: 252, emphasis in original). So a Sem is an instruction
to fetch (i.e., lexicalise) a previously available concept that is then used to build
a formally new concept(s). This formally new concept will be stored in the mind
somehow (and perhaps be recombined with other concepts to create yet more
formally new concepts), but the Sem itself is not a concept.
Another way to put the matter is as follows. Humans possess a great variety of
pre-lexical mental representations (many of which we share with other animals).
On the Conjunctivist account, these pre-lexical mental representations are linked
to formally distinct but analytically similar concepts. The latter are sometimes
referred to as I-concepts (Jackendoff 1989; 1990) to signal that the way in which
these concepts are to be studied is on themodel of the study of language signalled
by the use of I-language as opposed to E-language. Thus, “the repertoire of I-
concepts expressed by sentences cannot be mentally encoded as a list, but must
be characterized in terms of a finite set of mental primitives and a finite set of
principles of mental combination that collectively describe the set of possible
I-concepts expressed by sentences” (Jackendoff 1990: 9). I-concepts, then, are a
uniquely human subset of concepts that humans can use to think about the world.
It thus follows that “there may be many human concepts that cannot be fetched
or assembled via SEMs: acquirable I-languages may not interface with all the
concepts that humans enjoy”, for “there may be ways of assembling concepts
that SEMs cannot invoke” (Lohndal & Pietroski 2018: 325).
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If lexical meanings are understood to be instructions to fetch concepts, then
phrases are understood to be instructions to combine these fetched concepts in
specificways. So how are these lexicalised concepts conjoined? Let us look at two
simple examples taken from Pietroski (2010: 249-250) (see also Pietroski 2018).
Consider the phrase kick a brown cow. The acquisition of kick might involve the
process in which a dyadic concept like kick(x, y) is paired with a Phon, stored
in the mind, and then used to introduce a concept of events, kick(e). The latter
is then fetched and conjoined with the other concepts of the phrase kick a brown
cow, which were fetched in a similar way. Kick a brown cow can then be anal-
ysed in terms of the instructions to build concepts like •[kick(e), ∃•[patient(e,
x), •[brown(x), cow(x)]]]. “•” indicates a conjunction operator, patient(e, x)
is a concept of a thematic relation exhibited by certain events and participants
affected in those events, and “∃” existentially closes the participant variable (x).
In the same way, kick a carrot to a cow can be analysed in terms of the instruc-
tions to build a monadic concept like •[•[kick(e), ∃•[patient(e, x), carrot(x)]],
∃•[recipient(e, x), cow(x)]], which applies to kicks that have carrots as patients
and cows as recipients.
The internalist semantics claim, then, is that understanding an expression of
I-language (or perceiving its meaning) is a matter of (unconsciously) recognis-
ing that that expression is an instruction to construct concepts of a special kind.
This explanation of meaning also offers an explanation for the creative aspect
of language use, for it suggests the procedure by which we combine concepts in
recursively productive ways to yield formally new concepts and phrases.
It may seem as if this internalist explanation of meaning merely passes the
buck to concepts, thus avoiding the crucial explanatory question as to what
makes a proposition mean what it does. That is, claiming that lexical mean-
ings have as primitives non-lexical concepts that are then combined to produce
formally new concepts might be criticised for assuming (and thus leaving unex-
plained) the meanings of the primitives. This criticism is unwarranted for several
reasons. First, we cannot expect a theory of semantics to explain every primitive,
for at some point we move beyond semantics and into cognitive or perceptual
psychology (and ultimately into neuroscience). We are concerned here with lexi-
cal meaning, not with pre-lexical or non-linguistic conceptual structure. If biolin-
guistics is on the right track, then it follows that lexical concepts are a distinct
subset of concepts available to humans, a subset that is uniquely human in com-
parison to what is shared with other animals. But what about the other concepts?
That depends on what one takes non-linguistic (or pre-lexical) concepts to be, if
one takes them to be concepts at all. Since concepts are constituents of thoughts,
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the debate about the nature of non-linguistic concepts often overlaps with the
debate about whether animals can think or with the debate about whether lan-
guage is the medium of thought. There is a tradition in philosophy that argues
that all thought requires language (Malcolm 1972; Davidson 1975; 1982; Dummett
1989; McDowell 1994), whereas others have agreed with Fodor (1975: 56) that the
“obvious (and, I should have thought, sufficient) refutation of the claim that nat-
ural languages are the medium of thought is that there are nonverbal organisms
that think” (see also Ryle 1968; Slezak 2002; de Waal 2016). I do not want to
weigh in on the debate of whether cognitive processes as understood by cogni-
tive scientists are the same as what philosophers such as Malcolm and Davidson
understand to be thought processes. Whether or not we should conceive of the
cognitive processes that humans share with animals as thoughts with concepts
is orthogonal to my concerns here. I’ve argued elsewhere that humans share
with animals a great deal of thought processes but that humans also possess a
unique type of thought that is not available to animals without a language faculty
(Asoulin 2016; 2019) (see also Gallistel 1991; 2011).
An interesting corollary of the internalist understanding of meanings as effec-
tively tools for reformatting pre-lexical concepts to yield formally new concepts
is that these newly created concepts lie at a greater remove from the environment
than the concepts that get lexicalised. As Pietroski (2010) discusses, pre-lexical
concepts are different to the newly created concepts because the latter require
an additional kind of abstraction. That is, the creative aspect of lexicalisation
“promotes cognitive integration, by giving us new concepts that fit together in
recursively productive ways, [but] at the cost of giving us concepts that fit the
world less well than the concepts initially lexicalized” (Pietroski 2010: 250). The
process of lexicalisation results in the new concepts (and the phrases of which
they form the constituents) not fitting the world in the same way that pre-lexical
concepts do. The pre-lexical concepts that we share with other animals, on the
other hand, do exhibit “a functioning isomorphism between processes within the
brain or mind […] and an aspect of the environment to which those processes
adapt the animal’s behavior” (Gallistel 1990: 1-2). There is “a mapping from ex-
ternal entities or events (temporal intervals, numerosities of sets, rates of food
occurrence, shapes of patterns, chemical characteristics of foods, members of a
matrilineal family within a monkey group, and so on) to mental or neural vari-
ables that serve as representatives of those entities” (Gallistel 1990: 2). In other
words, in the case of pre-lexical concepts, “the concept of a mental or neural rep-
resentation depend[s] on the demonstration of a mapping from world variables
to mental or neural variables and on a formal correspondence between opera-
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tions in the two domains” (Gallistel 1990: 4). But lexical concepts and natural
language sentences do not work that way. As we’ll see later on, however, the
kind of referential semantics that externalism proposes assumes that natural lan-
guage is referential in this problematic way. But if “our ‘I-fetchable’ concepts are
systematically combinable because they were introduced to ensure such combin-
ability, then these concepts lie at greater remove from the environment than the
concepts we lexicalize” (Pietroski 2010: 266, emphasis in original).
There is thus a lack of one-to-one (or even one-to-many) relations between
mental representations and things in the world when it comes to natural lan-
guage. As Chomsky (2000; 2003a; 2003b; 2016) has discussed at length, this is
clear for even the simplest words. Take Chomsky’s famous example of London
(Chomsky 2000: 37). He remarks that London is of course not a fiction created
by our minds but “considering it as London – that is, through the perspective
of a city name, a particular type of linguistic expression – we accord it curious
properties” such as the following:
[…] we allow that under some circumstances, it could be completely de-
stroyed and rebuilt somewhere else, years or evenmillennia later, still being
London, that same city. [….] We can regard London with or without regard
to its population: from one point of view, it is the same city if its people
desert it; from another, we can say that London came to have a harsher feel
to it through theThatcher years, a comment on how people act and live. Re-
ferring to London, we can be talking about a location or area, people who
sometimes live there, the air above it (but not too high), buildings, institu-
tions, etc., in various combinations (as in London is so unhappy, ugly, and
polluted that it should be destroyed and rebuilt 100 miles away, still being the
same city).
We use terms such as London to talk and think about the mind-external world
but “there neither are nor are believed to be things-in-the-world with the proper-
ties of the intricate modes of reference that a city name encapsulates” (Chomsky
2000: 37). Another way to put the matter is as follows. The properties that we
attribute to the world via our everyday language are for science the products
of our minds (see McGilvray 2002 for discussion). That does not mean that the
mind creates all objects and thus there are nomind-independent objects out there.
Rather, it means that the scientific study of the way in which humans conceive
the world will be internalist.
Language-world relations are assumed in externalist semantics, and it is al-
most as often assumed that generative linguistics can provide an analysis of the
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language side of this relation. D’Ambrosio (2019: 214) understands semantics to
be a ”theory of the contents of natural-language expressions, where such con-
tents are ultimately found in the world, or constructed mathematically out of
pieces of reality.” On this view, ”semantics makes use of lexical postulates that ex-
press genuine relations between words and objects or collections of objects, and
from these premisses, semanticists derive theorems about what the world must
look like for natural-language sentences to be true.” Semantics is thus ”partly a
metaphysical theory—it is a version of the theory of truthmaking”. D’Ambrosio
claims that his account of the verbs we use in our semantic theorising (such as
refers (to), applies (to), and is true (of)) shows that internalist and externalist se-
mantics are compatible. King (2007; 2018) also argues that one can accept the
central features of generative linguistics and still endorse an externalist seman-
tics for I-languages. But this is far from clear. J. Collins (2007: 805) discusses
the “presumption that—at some level and in some way—the structures specified
by [generative] syntactic theory mesh with or support our conception of con-
tent/linguistic meaning as grounded in our first-person understanding of our
communicative speech acts.” This presumption is currently shared by many top
philosophers of language, but Collins shows that generative syntactic structure
both provides too much and too little to serve as the structural basis for the no-
tion of content as understood in philosophy. He argues that the philosopher’s
“content, as it were, is the result of a massive cognitive interaction effect as op-
posed to an isomorphic map onto syntactic structure” (J. Collins 2007: 806).
2.3 What about mind-world relations?
A common misconception of internalist semantics is that it sees as irrelevant or
ignores the environment of the speaker or the context of the speech act. A corol-
lary of this misconception is the argument favouring externalism that argues
that, if meaning is construed as “an internal phenomenon” that rejects relations
to the extra-mental world, then there will be “a wholesale and incomprehensible
relativism concerning truth” and “a total collapse in our belief in the existence
of the external world” (Ferguson 2009: 299, quoting Millikan 1984: 7). That is, “if
meaning is equated with intensions of the individual language users” then the
extension of words is derivative of these mental representations and thus “this
derived extension is never actually put into direct correspondence with external
objects but only with user’s concepts of such objects” (Ferguson 2009: 299-300,
emphasis in original). In other words, the externalist worry is that if meaning is
construed as an internal phenomenon then words are not connected to the ex-
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ternal world but only to the user’s internal mental representations of them and
thus there is no way to distinguish between a true representation of something
in the world and a misrepresentation.
Moreover, it is claimed that realism itself is at stake. Millikan is explicit about
this point: she argues that the “assumption that whatever meaning is, it must
determine reference or extension is the very essence of realism” (Millikan 1984:
329). She takes issue with what she calls meaning rationalism, with the claim
that we can know a priori “that in seeming to think or talk about something we
are thinking or talking about – anything at all.” That is, meaning rationalism
claims that we can “know a priori that we mean” and “know a priori or with
Cartesian certainty what it is that we are thinking or talking about” (Millikan
1984: 10, emphasis in original). This is “a view of meaning that is completely in-
ternal”, a “theory of meaning that sees the extension of words as a function of the
intensions of individual speakers, with no way to ensure that these intensions
actually correspond to anything in the external world” (Ferguson 2009: 299). Mil-
likan claims that meaning rationalism “permeates nearly every nook and cranny
of our philosophical tradition” and that “[i]n order even to come to comprehend
what meaning rationalism is, what various forms it can take, it is necessary force-
fully to fling down on the table something with which to contrast it” (Millikan
1984: 92, emphasis in original). Millikan’s own externalist theory of meaning
(teleosemantics) is then offered as a contrast. I should note that meaning ratio-
nalism, understood as an internalist (individualist) view of meaning, certainly
no longer “permeates nearly every nook and cranny of our philosophical tradi-
tion”: the tables have completely turned. As noted above, it is now claimed that
“externalism has been so successful that the primary focus of today’s debate is
not so much on whether externalism is right or wrong, but rather on what its
implications are” (Wikforss 2008: 158).
The externalist worry, then, is that an internalist view ofmeaning and concepts
either leads to an attack on realism or to an idealism of some sort. Millikan
remarks that
The important thing is that meaning rationalism led to the conclusion that
all our genuine concepts are of things that have a most peculiar ontological
status. They are things that are and that can be known to be, yet that have
no necessary relation to the actual world. They are things that do not need
the world about which we make ordinary judgements in order to be. They
must be Platonic forms, or reified “concepts” or reified “meanings” or things
having “intentional inexistence” or reified “possibilities” – or else they must
be nothing at all! (Millikan 1984: 328, emphasis in original)
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This worry about internalist theories of meaning of any sort is not limited
to Millikan. Fodor (2000; 2007), for example, worries that Chomsky’s internal-
ist semantics is a sort of idealism about meaning. Fodor understands internalist
semantics to eschew relations between concepts and the world in favour of rela-
tions among the concepts themselves, and he believes that Chomsky is motivated
by epistemological concerns. So, as Fodor paints the scene, since knowledge in-
volves representation, the question is howwe can know the world independently
of the ways in which we represent it. That is, “if representation is itself a kind
of mind-world relation, we can’t know whether we ever do succeed in thinking
about the world. (/about what our words mean, etc.)” (Fodor 2007: 6). Fodor
thinks that one of the motivations for an internalist semantics is this epistemo-
logical question, which would then be answered by internalists by holding that
representation is constituted by relations among our thoughts only. And since
“we can know about such relations [among our thoughts] (by introspection for
example) we likewise can know for sure such putatively analytic truths as that
bachelors are unmarried, that cats are animals, and so forth” (Fodor 2007: 6). In
other words, Fodor argues that internalist semantics is in effect a proposal “to
avoid skepticism about knowledge by adopting a sort of Idealism about meaning:
all our ideas are ideas about ideas” (Fodor 2007: 6).
Fodor’s misconstrual of Chomsky’s internalism is revealing in several respects,
and so it is worth exploring in detail. It shows the intuitive pull that externalist
theories of meaning have as well as the theoretical motivations driving external-
ism (see also the discussion in the next chapter and Slezak 2002; 2004; 2018). It
is especially revealing in Fodor’s case because he was one of the first to present
(along with Jerrold Katz in 1963) a version of semantics that was compatible with
generative syntax. Even though Fodor admits that he’s “not at all sure that this
is Chomsky’s view”, he gives a long list of reasons for why “succumbing to rep-
resentational Idealism strikes me as a strategy that is to be avoided at all costs”
(Fodor 2007: 6) (Fodor at times refers to Chomsky’s internalist semantics as se-
mantic Idealism or representational Idealism). Let us look at some of those rea-
sons, addressing each in turn below. Fodor (2007: 7-8) claims the following:
(i) That it “is wildly implausible that we don’t, at least some of the time,
think about the world. Semantic Idealism seems to deny this and hence to
be false on the face of it.” That is, the claim is that internalist semantics
“rejects the notion of mind-world correspondence”.
(ii) The view of meaning Fodor supposes Chomsky endorses apparently re-
quires that there be a great deal of analytic propositions and thus “avoids
skepticism about whether bachelors are unmarried; we really can know that
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they are; in fact, anyone who has the concept BACHELOR must know that
they are”. But Fodor counters that “it’s very unclear how this is supposed
to work for knowledge of ‘contingent’ propositions (for example the case
of one’s perceptually grounded true belief that the cat is on the mat.) In
such cases, our knowledges simply can’t come from our grasp of relations
among ideas: It’s not part of the idea CAT that this one (the one I’m, just
now looking at) is on a mat; and it’s not part of the idea MAT that this
one now has a cat that’s on it.” If we suppose that empirical knowledge is
a mind-world relation, then “[s]emantic Idealism avoids skepticism about
‘conceptual truths’ only at the cost of making a total mystery of empirical
truth”. That is, the claim is that there is something wrong with a seman-
tics that implies that “our concepts are constrained by their relations to one
another but not by their relations to the world”.
(iii) Fodor also claims that “semantic Idealism can’t account for the fact that,
at least some times, we are able to make rational choices among conflict-
ing beliefs; in particular, among conflicting scientific theories”. That is, it
seems to follow that “theories can’t be rationally compared because what
their terms in a theory mean is determine[d] internal to the theory. If I
think dogs have tails and you think they don’t, then we must ‘mean some-
thing different’ by ‘dog’ so there’s no way of settling what appears to be
the disagreement between us.”
In summary, Fodor’s belief is that if we take internalist semantics to claim
that semantic relations hold only among ideas, then it follows that we can only
think about mind-dependent things. But, he says, “it’s simply untrue that what-
ever we can think about is mind dependent”, for “we can think about The Grand
Canyon, which surely was around before there were any minds and presumably
will continue to be when all the minds are gone. The world (consider[ed] as the
potential object of indefinitely many thoughts) is prior to the mind. A fortiori,
the objects of thought can’t themselves all be mental.” Fodor concludes that it is
“an infallible sign of bad semantics that it leads to bad metaphysics” (Fodor 2007:
8).
Note that Fodor (like Millikan and others) is here importing epistemological
and metaphysical worries into the debate about the fecundity of a semantic the-
ory. It is not at all clear that epistemological worries about the nature of knowl-
edge and skepticism thereof are relevant to semantic theories. Fodor (2007: 6)
takes such relevance to be “more or less truistic” but herein lies the problem.
That the externalist conception of semantics is taken to be a truism is perhaps
too strong, but the underlying intuition is clear and goes back to the early days
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of externalist critiques of internalist semantics. In the oft-quoted words of Lewis
(1970: 18), “[s]emantics with no treatment of truth conditions is not semantics.”
Lewis was very critical of the internalist semantics of the 1960s (Katz & Fodor
1963; Katz & Postal 1964), a version of which is still held by biolinguists today,
because he felt that it dealt with “nothing but symbols”. That is, assigning to sen-
tences particular symbols or semantic markers that are supposed to explain their
semantic interpretation (what Lewis called Semantic Markerese) is supposed to
be invalid because it “amounts merely to a translation algorithm from the object
language to the auxiliary language Markerese” (Lewis 1970: 18). The translation
of sentences into symbolic (but, crucially, non-linguistic) expressions is seen by
Lewis to be “at best a substitute for real semantics, relying either on our tacit
competence (at some future date) as speakers of Markerese or on our ability
to do real semantics at least for the one language Markerese” (Lewis 1970: 18).
Lewis erroneously takes Markerese to be akin to a natural language and jokes
that, given certain qualifications, we might as well translate the sentences into
Latin. In other words, Markerese semantics cannot deal “with the relations be-
tween symbols and the world of non-symbols – that is, with genuinely semantic
relations” (Lewis 1970: 19).
But we do not (and cannot) speak Markerese as a natural language (any more
thanwe can see the visual mental representations our brain uses to process edges
in a visual scene, or speak physics) and the fact that Lewis thought this was im-
plied by internalist semantics is again revealing. Internalist semantics proposes
a mental structure (an I-language) in virtue of which language production and
comprehension aremade possible. This structure is not available to introspection,
nor is it anything like a natural language that we can understand qua speakers,
and so the claim that internalist semantic theories rely on the tacit competence
of us as speakers of Markerese is a misunderstanding of the internalist project.
The claim that internalist semantics is “nothing but” symbol manipulation has
remained a consistent misconstrual of internalism since Lewis, the main reason
being that semantics is taken to essentially make epistemological and metaphysi-
cal claims. Fodor and Lewis are far from alone in this. Ludlow (2003), for example,
argues for a certain kind of language-world isomorphism. As he puts it, “[t]he
idea is that the linguistic representations will indeed underwrite our metaphysi-
cal intuitions, but that because of this we can expect our metaphysical intuitions
to shed some light on the nature of I-language” (Ludlow 2003: 154). In other
words, a “plausible hypothesis […] is that any grasp we have on metaphysics is
by virtue of our having the linguistic representations that we do” (Ludlow 2003:
155). Ludlow tries to have it both ways. He assumes with Fodor that there ex-
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ists a language-world relation such that studying the structure of language can
shed light on the structure of the world, but he wants to do this within an inter-
nalist semantic picture. That is, Ludlow argues that our metaphysical intuitions
can be underwritten by the structure of I-language. As he puts it, we “do have
substantial independent knowledge of the language faculty, and we can use that
knowledge to gain insight into the nature of reality” (Ludlow 2003: 154).
It appears that Ludlow has the samemotivation as Fodor in trying to preserve a
certain conception of mind-world relations so that it could underwrite truth and
realism. It is thus no coincidence that both Fodor and Ludlow (albeit in different
ways) propose an externalist referential semantics that could be compatible with
I-languages. However, the language-world relation that is posited by externalists
is problematic at best (see chapter 3 for discussion). We can understand language
in the language-world relation as either the surface structure of sentences and
their pronunciations or as the underlying structure. Both are unhelpful in regard
to metaphysics or epistemology. If we take the relation to be between the surface
forms of language (say the words sheep or river) and the world then we can of
course agree that those words are used to refer to sheep or rivers and thus agree
that there exist sheep and rivers. That is, Ludlow’s and the externalists’ claim
is that the word sheep refers to sheep in the world, and that we can use this
fact to underwrite our metaphysical theory about what can exist in the world.
That is, the claim is that we can successfully refer to sheep in the world because
sheep exist in the world. If we can refer to them then they exist, and so we can
infer the latter from the former. However, as Chomsky quips, we “can accept
all this at the level at which we abandon curiosity about language and mind,
about human action and its roots and properties” (Chomsky 2003a: 290). If we
take the relation to be between the surface forms of language and the world,
are we making a metaphysical claim about the constituents of the world? It is
difficult to see how this position can be substantiated, at least if we construe
the metaphysical claim to be part of natural science. Alternatively, if we take
the relation to be between the underlying structures of language (say the logical
forms of linguistic expressions) and the world then we also run into difficulties.
If the underlying structures in the relation are couched in terms of logical form
or in terms of syntax, then as J. Collins (2007) shows, there is both too much and
too little structure in syntax to serve the purposes that philosophers want them
to serve.
The language-world relation, however, is problematic in a deeper sense. As
Chomsky (1995a; 2000; 2003a; 2003b) argues, the analogous argument in regard
to sound is absurd, so why is it taken seriously in regard to meaning. That is, sup-
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pose (following the thought experiment in Chomsky 2003b: 270 ff.) that we talk
of a denotational or referential phonology as parallel to a denotational or referen-
tial semantics. So that instead ofPhon in the expressionExp =< Phon; Sem >,
which explains the sound properties of the expression in an internalist fashion,
the expression lacks Phon and is instead said to P-denote some object that is
external to the speaker, call it a phonetic value (PV). One can even suppose that
some computation on the phonetic value yields the sound component of expres-
sions. The phonetic value could be said to be a construction from physical sound
waves and the proposal could be elaborated by taking into account the social
context of the speakers. Given this denotational account of phonology, we could
then offer an account of communication, translation, and perhaps even language
acquisition. So, for example, we could say that “Peter is able to communicate
with Tom because the same PV is denoted by their expressions in the language
they share (but only partially know)” (Chomsky 2003b: 271). However, as should
be clear, a denotational phonology gets us nowhere and in fact “leaves all prob-
lems where they were, adding a host of new ones”, for we “understand nothing
more than before about the relation of [the expression] E to its external mani-
festations” and thus such an “account of communication and other processes is
worthless” (Chomsky 2003b: 271). The introduction of phonetic values is com-
pletely unhelpful in regard to explaining how humans interpret the sounds of
linguistic expressions and there are of course no serious theories of denotational
phonology.
The language-world relation in regard to sound is never postulated, whereas
the language-world relation in regard to meaning is commonplace. These two
postulated relations are of course not identical, but they are similar enough to
present a puzzle as to why denotational phonology is rightly dismissed as absurd
whereas denotational semantics is taken seriously. One could perhaps make the
counter argument that sound doesn’t “mean” anything, but this begs the question.
Indeed, semantics doesn’t “mean” anything in the everyday sense either. Seman-
tics explains interpretation but does not provide interpretation per se. More on
this in the next chapter.
Fodor’s misconstrual of semantic internalism claims that Chomsky’s language
faculty hypothesis is an epistemological proposal. As J. Collins (2004) has argued
at length, Fodor reads into Chomsky’s work (and into internalist semantics in
general) epistemological proposals about what speakers know about their lan-
guage. This type of knowledge is said by Fodor to be propositional knowledge
as understood in philosophy, thus bringing in issues of truth, belief, and justifi-
cation. It follows, then, contrary to explicit pronouncements by internalists and
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biolinguists, that the hypothesis of the language faculty is not a proposal about
a specific mental structure in the mind. But as we saw above, the biolinguistic
claim is just that. Indeed, whether it is true or not, internalist semantics does not
make epistemological claims at all. Jackendoff’s remarks in regard to the tension
that exists between fundamental questions in a theory of mind are relevant here.
There is what he calls a philosophical approach that “grows out of questions of
epistemology”, and there is the psychological approach that “grows out of issues
in perception” and questions of how the brain functions. Jackendoff argues that
this tension has “the flavor of a paradigm split in the sense of Kuhn” (Jackendoff
1991: 411-412).
Moreover, Jackendoff points to the fact that Fodor “embodies in a single per-
son both sides of the paradigm split” (Jackendoff 1991: 412, emphasis in original).
On the one hand, Jackendoff notes, Fodor wants to be a psychologist by insist-
ing that an organism’s behaviour is determined by its computational mental rep-
resentations. On the other hand, Fodor is “holding on very hard to his roots
as a philosopher in his use of the terms true and false with respect to mental
representations” (Jackendoff 1991: 412). Jackendoff argues that since the philo-
sophical approach “leads to uncomfortable metaphysical problems”, one should
abandon it in favour of the psychological approach that “permits – at least in
principle – a revealing account of the phenomena” (Jackendoff 1991: 416). The
conclusions Jackendoff draws are supposed to apply to the philosophical and
psychological approaches to perception, but as we’ll see in the next chapter, the
same “paradigm split” exists in the debate between semantic internalism and ex-
ternalism where externalists insist upon the relevance of truth and reference to
semantic theories whereas internalists reject the relevance of such notions to a
scientific semantic theory.
***
The next chapter will discuss the externalist approach to semantics, but before
moving on let me briefly outline where the argument is going. After detailing the
externalist approach I will argue in the final chapter that internalism is a promis-
ing solution to the problem of constructing a scientific theory of semantics, a
solution that does not include the various additives that externalists demand be
included in a semantic theory. Externalism will thus be discussed from the point
of view of explanatory scientific theories. I will ask what externalism is sup-
posed to explain, and whether such an explanation is or can be a scientific one.
In contrast to leading externalists, I argue that whatever merits externalism may
possess, it is unable to provide a fruitful explanatory framework for a scientific
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theory of meaning. I argue that an externalist explanation of meaning is con-
cerned with ascription and description of meaning rather than themechanisms of
meaning. That is, externalism is not concerned with the mental mechanisms in
virtue of which humans produce and comprehend meaning. In chapter 4, I argue
that a fruitful scientific explanation is one that aims to uncover the underlying
mechanisms in virtue of which the observable phenomena are made possible,
and that a scientific semantics should be doing just that. Therefore, externalist
explanations are not part of the psychological explanation of the mechanisms in
virtue of which meaning is made possible. Rather, externalist explanations are
an interpretive and hermeneutic explanatory project.
In his discussion of externalism, Chomsky remarks that it faces a choice: if it
is conceived as part of ethnoscience, “it is making the factual claim that people
(in our culture, or universally) attribute thoughts, beliefs, etc., which they indi-
viduate by reference to environment or social context, and then faces the task of
clarifying and defending that empirical thesis”. If, on the other hand, externalism
is conceived as part of psychology, then “it is making the claim that among the en-
tities of the world, alongside of complex molecules and (maybe) I-languages, are
mental states individuated by environment and social context, and it will again
have to explain what these entities are, show how they function, and provide
empirical confirmation for its conclusions about these matters” (Chomsky 2003:
269-270). Chomsky is skeptical about the prospects for both of these construals
of externalism and stresses that whichever way we understand externalism, the
normal criteria for scientific theory evaluation should be satisfied. Chomsky’s
skepticism is warranted in regard to externalism understood as part of psychol-
ogy, but there is still value to the way inwhich externalism approaches semantics
as hermeneutics in that (if sharpened and explicitly understood in this way) it
can help in shedding light on the way in which language users ascribe meanings
to words or phrases in particular contexts. But this should not be confused with
the scientific task of unearthing the mechanisms in virtue of which language
production and comprehension are made possible.
This is where the argument is headed. But first let us explore the externalist
approach to semantics.
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As noted above, the externalist approach is currently somewhat of an orthodoxy
in the philosophy of mind and in the philosophy of language. Moreover, this
approach is not limited to philosophy, for much work in linguistics (for example,
in formal semantics and formal pragmatics) takes the truth conditional approach
to meaning. There are a number of positions that go by the name of externalism,
but I will focus here on Twin Earth externalism. That is, the accounts that rest
on a Twin-Earth-style thought experiment, the most famous version of which
is Putnam (1975). This is the standard understanding of externalism. Indeed, as
Farkas (2003) notes, some philosophers use Twin Earth thought experiments as
part of the very definition of what externalism is (see also McLaughlin & Tye
1998). Moreover, standard linguistics textbooks in formal semantics also approv-
ingly discuss these thought experiments (see, for example, Portner 2005: 7ff.).
The Twin Earth thought experiment claims to show that two subjects can have
identical internal mental states but that the content of these states can be differ-
ent due to particular variations in the environment. In other words, the claim is
that the content of mental states can vary with variations in the environmental
or socio-environmental conditions of two subjects while their respective internal
mental states remain identical. The conclusion of externalist semantics, then, is
that meanings are individuated by reference to environmental features or social
contexts, and that therefore in order for a person’s utterance to have a particular
meaning it must be related to the environment in the right way.
Note that even though much of the discussion in the externalist literature is
couched in terms of content, it is clear that the conclusions in regard to content
are meant to apply to linguistic meaning as well. Burge, for example, is explicit
about this: “The arguments for anti-individualistic individuation of mental kinds
can be extended in relatively obvious ways to show that much of semantics is
not purely individualistic [i.e., it is externalist]” (Burge 1989: 279). This can be
generalised, so that externalist arguments couched in terms of mental content
can be applied to linguistic meaning, as indeed they often are. Content is per-
haps a broader term that can apply to non-linguistic mental states such as visual
perceptions, or perhaps content is entirely distinct from linguistic meaning. But
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whatever content turns out to be, externalists argue that its nature will have di-
rect bearing on the nature of meaning. In addition, the fact that Burge says that
his philosophy of language has a direct bearing on much of semantics shows that
he construes his externalist theoretical aims to overlap with those of linguistics
and semantics in particular.
There are two traditional assumptions that lurk in the background of the de-
bate in the externalist literature. These are (i) the claim that the meanings of
words are fixed by the psychological states of those who use them, and (ii) the
claim that the meanings of words determine their extension or reference. Exter-
nalism is supposed to entail that (i) and (ii) are incompatible. Thus, the Twin
Earth thought experiments purport to show that since meaning determines ref-
erence – and so terms with the same meaning will have the same reference – the
psychological states of the twins cannot determine their meaning because the
reference of their utterance of water is different. In other words, if one agrees
that a difference in meaning implies a difference in reference, then one cannot
hold that meaning is determined by psychological states; this is because, ex hy-
pothesi, the psychological states of the twins are identical but the reference is
different. Putnam argued that it is possible for two speakers to be in exactly the
same psychological state, even though the extension of a term in one speaker is
different to the extension of the same term in the second speaker. If this is cor-
rect, he argued, one must give up one of the traditional assumptions (i.e., give up
either (i) or (ii)).
I want to argue, however, that it is possible to hold both (i) and (ii), but not for
the reasons one might expect. That is, (i) is a psychological explanatory project
in regard to meaning and mind (as illustrated by internalist semantics in the pre-
vious chapter), and (ii) is a hermeneutic explanatory project. As a result, there is
no tension between holding that a person’s psychological states fix their mean-
ings and holding that meaning determines reference. In other words, (i) is part
of the explanation of the psychological mechanisms in virtue of which meaning
is made possible, whereas (ii) plays an interpretive function for the theorist by
linking internal psychological states and the world.
As noted above, Jackendoff (1991) makes a similar point when he compares the
tension that exists in regard to fundamental questions for a theory of mind. Barry
Smith (1992) draws a parallel distinction between what he calls the interpretive,
descriptive, and explanatory stances to a theory of meaning. At one end of the
spectrum “we have the language-dissolving view of interpretation, which at the
limit slides into hermeneutics and literary theory where there are no standards
of correctness at all. (‘Anyone can do the philosophy of language’).” At the other
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end of the spectrum there is “an extreme philosophy of language” which “gives
way to empirical research. (‘Best left to the scientists’).” Smith advocates a theory
of meaning that “must come somewhere in between”, and he takes Chomsky’s
framework as setting “a constraint on any satisfactory solution [to the problem
of meaning]” (Smith 1992: 138-139). Smith’s position is more conciliatory and
closer to the position I argue for here, for it leaves some room for the philosoph-
ical and hermeneutic approach to semantics. In contrast, Jackendoff’s claim that
the philosophical and psychological approaches to a theory of mind are disparate
in the sense of Kuhn is too strong, for it neglects the interest and value that lies in
the hermeneutic explanatory project. Nevertheless, there is a systematic differ-
ence between the questions that externalists attempt to answer and the questions
that internalists attempt to answer. Thus, if the externalist mode of explanation is
a hermeneutic one, then despite the claims of many externalists it will be unable
to provide an explanatory framework for a science of semantics.
If we assume that meaning is externalist as defined by Lewis and others and
thatwe cannot individuate themeanings of utteranceswithout reference tomind-
external factors, what follows in regard to the science of meaning? I agree that
one can only discern what a person’s utterance refers to by consulting the exter-
nal environment, and that the referents or extensions or denotations of thoughts
cannot be exclusively determined by mind-internal matters – the question, say,
of whether a referent is a sheep or a bush that looks like a sheep cannot be de-
termined without consulting the external environment. But these are questions
of meaning ascription or individuation. I argue in what follows that scientific ex-
planations do not attempt to answer such questions, at least not in the way that
is claimed in the externalist literature. That is, I argue that the externalist claim
that there exists a deep-rooted link between inner psychological states and their
extension is not problematic – indeed, it is essential and potentially fruitful – for
the hermeneutic explanatory project of thought contents. However, in regard
to the psychological explanatory project of the latter, questions of attribution or
individuation do not play a key role.
3.1 The subject matter of externalism
Leading externalists explicitly and repeatedly state that their theories are part
of the scientific project. What are we to make of such claims? Do criteria for
ascription and description of meaning belong in a scientific theory? We should
question the assumption that externalism is directly relevant to a scientific theory
of meaning that attempts to unearth the mechanisms in virtue of which meaning
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works in the mind. Putnam argues that a better philosophy and a better science
of language is externalist. But what does Putnam understand to be the details of
his science of language? One of his other thought experiments supposes that “[i]f
Twin Earth organisms have a silicon chemistry, for example, then their ‘tigers’
aren’t really tigers, even if they look like tigers, although the linguistic habits of
the lay Twin Earth speaker exactly correspond to those of Earth speakers” (Put-
nam 1975: 167). This stems from Putnam’s (and the externalists’) belief that “exten-
sion is tied to the notion of truth” and that the “extension of a term is just what the
term is true of” (Putnam 1975: 154, emphasis in original). Thus, according to this
reasoning, we can only determine the meaning of a person’s utterance – whether
the meaning of the person’s utterance really is tiger – by consulting the external
environment and checking whether the utterance is true of that environment. A
person on Earth and his doppelgänger on Twin Earth can have the same inter-
nal psychological states or concepts (tigers are striped, they’re quadrupeds, they
have paws, they have whiskers, etc.) and yet mean different things when they
utter tiger because the tigers in their environment are different – one is carbon-
based and the other is silicon-based. Putnam concludes that the same utterance
spoken by him and by his doppelgänger can have different meanings, “but this
will not be an assertion about our psychological states” (Putnam 1975: 165).
This is a curious statement. If we take a science of language to encompass ex-
ternalist relations in the way that Putnam urges, and if we agree that language
processing is somehow instantiated in the brain, what are we to make of the
claim that externalist theories of meaning do not make assertions about psy-
chological states? Fodor similarly argues that “[i]t is, to put the point starkly,
the heart of externalism that semantics isn’t part of psychology. The content of
your thoughts (/utterances), unlike for example, the syntax of your thoughts
(/utterances), does not supervene on your mental processes” (Fodor 1994: 38, em-
phasis in original). It is far from unusual to find such statements claiming that
semantics (or philosophy of language, for that matter) is not about underlying
psychological states. Soames (1984), for example, argues that “linguistic theories
are conceptually distinct and empirically divergent from psychological theories
of language acquisition and linguistic competence” (Soames 1984: 155). Soames
denies that linguistic theories are theories of “[c]omplex, unconscious, compu-
tational states and processes [that] underlie language acquisition and mastery”
(Soames 1984: 155). There is much more to say on the matter, but for the mo-
ment let us note that such claims are in direct opposition to the way in which
internalist semantics and biolinguistics practice their research programs. Inter-
nalist semantics, as we saw above, explicitly takes its theories to be about the
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underlying computational mechanisms in virtue of which language production
and comprehension are made possible. Soames, however, claims that generative
linguistics and psychology “are concerned with different domains, make differ-
ent claims, and are established by different means” and thus “linguistics does
not yield computational and representational theories in cognitive psychology”
(Soames 1984: 157). Soames insists on separating the conceptual and empirical
foundations of generative linguistics from those of psychology. But contrary to
his claims, his construal of linguistics does not apply to generative linguistics
and in fact he has misunderstood its aims and methodology.
At the risk of gratuitously discussing yet another misconstrual of internalism,
I would like to briefly discuss Soames’s misconstrual. It is important to under-
stand how widespread this confusion is. People like Fodor, Soames, and others
discussed here, are leading figures who know the literature of generative linguis-
tics quite well. It is thus of great interest to unearth the source of their miscon-
strual of internalism, for it both sheds light on the underlying (and I would argue
mostly implicit) theoretical assumptions of hermeneutic projects such as exter-
nalism and helps to clarify the research program of internalism. The claim of
generative linguistics (and, later, biolinguistics) to be part of psychology (and ul-
timately biology) has been debated for decades with little consensus. As has the
internalist semantics claim that meanings are internal psychological phenomena.
Unpacking the reason for this seemingly recalcitrant debate shows the Kuhnian
split between the two camps is due to the often unnoticed fact that one is a
hermeneutic project and the other is a scientific project.
Soames proposes three “LeadingQuestions” that linguistics should attempt to
answer; they are:
(i) In what ways are English and Italian/the Romance languages/all Indo-
European languages/all natural languages alike and in what ways do they
differ?
(ii) What (if anything) distinguishes natural languages from some set of
artificial languages (such as finite state languages) or from animal commu-
nication systems?
(iii) In what ways has a particular language (a description (or list) of one
or more natural languages) changed and in what ways has it remained the
same? (Soames 1984: 158)
Later in the article he remarks that “by linguistics I mean the discipline defined
by the Leading Questions discussed earlier and practiced today by generative
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grammarians” (Soames 1984: 178, fn. 24, emphasis in original). However, what-
ever virtue and interest the answers to the LeadingQuestions may yield, it is not
at the core of what generative linguists do. The separation that Soames wants to
draw between linguistics and psychology is that between a linguistics that “aims
at providing theories of natural languages” and that of a “cognitive psychology
[that] aims at providing theories of natural language users” (Soames 1984: 157).
But this distinction is not applicable to generative linguistics, for generative lin-
guistics explicitly deals with providing a theory of what is in the head of language
users in virtue of which their language production and comprehension are made
possible.
Soames wishes, then, to distinguish between “non-mentalistic” linguistics and
“non-linguistic” psychology; he remarks that “[s]ince the job of a linguistic the-
ory is to specify the similarities and differences among (possible) languages, such
a theory must be sensitive to truth conditions (or elements that determine them)”
(Soames 1984: 163). The appeal to truth conditions (a hallmark of externalism) is
the real reason for Soames’s insistence that linguistics is not psychology: “lan-
guages may differ not only with respect to syntactic and phonological properties,
but also with respect to semantic properties involving truth conditions”, and thus
a linguistic theory “that failed to account for truth conditions would miss these
differences” (Soames 1984: 162). In other words, if “linguists’ grammars were
simply psychological theories, then claims about truth conditions would them-
selves be psychological”, but since “these claims are not (purely) psychological
in nature, it follows that grammars are not wholly psychological in nature and
that linguistics is not merely a branch of psychology” (Soames 1984: 163). The ar-
gument is that since semantics (as construed by Soames and other externalists)
makes use of “extra-psychological notions” (that is, “to give the truth conditions
of sentences is to specify the non-linguistic conditions that would make them
true”), “it follows that linguistic semantics is conceptually distinct from psycho-
logical models of semantic competence” (Soames 1984: 163, emphasis in original).
More recently, Soames (2009) has been somewhat more charitable to psycholog-
ical models of semantic competence, but he still argues in favour of a “nonpsy-
chologistic perspective” according to which “[s]entences, and other expressions,
have grammatical structures and representational contents that can be studied
in abstraction from questions about how they initially came to have those struc-
tures and contents, what psychological states and processes are responsible for
their retaining them, or how speakers come to know whatever they do know
about them” (Soames 2009: 1-2).
One is of course free to choose the perspective within which to study meaning
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that they feel will yield the most fecund explanation. One can agree with Soames
(2009: 183) that the “job of semantics is to specify the principles by which sen-
tences represent the world”. That is, since it “is impossible to represent the world
as being a certain way without implicitly imposing conditions that must be satis-
fied if the world is to conform to the representation”, “whatever else a semantic
theory must do, it must at least characterize truth conditions.” Soames sees this
construal of the job of semantics to be part of the “basics” of the field, implying
that if one were not to do semantics in this way then one would not be doing
semantics. But this at best reduces to the a priori assertion that “real semantics”
(Lewis 1970) is concerned with truth conditions. It of course follows from this
assertion that linguistics isn’t part of psychology, for in order to specify truth
conditions one must make use of “extra-psychological notions”. But this asser-
tion begs the question: the issue in generative linguistics (which Soames claims
is characterised by the Leading Questions) is what kind of semantic theory fits
within a scientific framework of the study of the mind. One cannot legislate what
“real semantics” is and then proceed to argue that therefore semantics is not part
of psychology. Moreover, by asserting that a linguistic theory must be sensitive
to truth conditions, Soames has indeed distinguished linguistics from psychol-
ogy, but this characterisation of linguistics, pace Soames (1984: 178, fn. 24), is not
that of generative linguistics.
It could be objected here that truth-theoretic semanticists do not see their se-
mantic theory as contributing to a scientific theory of the mind that seeks to
unearth the underlying mechanisms in virtue of which meaning is made possi-
ble, and thus it would be moot to compare the two. But there are many leading
externalists and formal semanticists who explicitly claim that their project is a
scientific one with similar aims to those of generative linguistics. It is thus both
warranted and illuminating to look at the externalist research program from the
perspective of scientific explanatory strategies and to ask whether it is a promis-
ing avenue in regard to constructing an explanatory scientific theory.
That said, however, there are plenty of philosophers of language who wish
to separate an externalist semantics from a semantics construed psychologically.
Dummett, for example, argues that philosophy “is not concerned with what en-
ables us to speak as we do, but what it is for utterances to have the meanings
that they have” (Dummett 1994: 187-188, emphasis in original). That is,
[…] a theory of meaning is required to make the workings of language open
to our view. To know a language is to be able to employ a language; hence,
once we have an explicit account of that in which the knowledge of a lan-
guage consists, we thereby have an account of the workings of that lan-
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guage; and nothing short of that can give us what we are after. (Dummett
1993: 4)
Dummett insists that “oncewe can saywhat it is for someone to know a language,
in the sense of knowing the meanings of all expressions of the language, then we
have essentially solved every problem that can arise concerning meaning” (Dum-
mett 1993: 4). In other words, “[a]ny theory of meaning which was not, or did not
immediately yield, a theory of understanding, would not satisfy the purpose for
which, philosophically, we require a theory of meaning” (Dummett 1993: 4). The
claim here is that semantics is not part of psychology, nor is it part of a linguis-
tics construed as part of psychology (as biolinguistics and internalist semantics
take themselves to be). Indeed, Dummett (1994: 187) complains that Chomsky’s
theory of meaning “is really a theory of something very complicated that goes
on in the brain” and “that is a completely unphilosophical way of looking at the
matter.”
So what is the subject matter of an externalist semantics if not psychology or
the mental states of language users? Externalist semanticists see their task as
providing an account of the relation between linguistic expressions and things
in the world. This relation can be fleshed out in several ways, but what underlies
them all is the concern with the conditions or rules of ascription: when is one
justified in ascribing a particular content to a particular utterance, and what is
the correct content that should be ascribed. Given such aims, then, what does
the research project take itself to be explaining? Once this question is answered
one can address the further question of whether externalist explanations are sci-
entific as some leading externalists claim to be the case. In other words, does
externalism employ a form of understanding that is appropriate to a cognitive
psychological explanation? Or, in contrast, is the way in which externalism un-
derstands the mind orthogonal to that of cognitive psychology? This highlights
an important distinction, one between different research projects that are often
conflated. That is, the distinction is that between, on the one hand, the notion
of understanding that refers to interpreting a sentence as a speaker of the lan-
guage (verstehen) and, on the other hand, the notion of understanding that refers
to explaining as in science (erklären). As Slezak (2004) shows, the question of
semantics or the content of mental representations is often confused between
whether representations are intelligible to the theorist and whether they are ex-
plainable by the theory (see also Slezak 1990; 2018).
Peacocke (1993), which details how explanation by externalist states is sup-
posed to work, is a case in point of such a conflation. It is, he says, “partially
constitutive” of the identity of any externalist state that “it can explain, or be ex-
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plained by, relational properties of external objects or events” (Peacocke 1993:
206). Relational properties, such as the “highly relational property of saying
something which has a certain meaning”, are argued to be explained psycholog-
ically (Peacocke 1993: 204). Psychology can be done in an externalist fashion on
Peacocke’s conception (and thus aid in the study of semantics), for a psycholog-
ical explanation of an event explains a particular set of its relational properties.
Peackocke thus explicitlymerges the externalist approachwith the psychological
approach, taking the externalist framework as a means to achieve a psychologi-
cal explanation of the mind.
But what is the nature of these relational properties? These are properties that
exist only in virtue of relations to other objects; the properties depend on the
relations and there is no sense in which they could exist independently of them.
Nuccetelli (2003: 3) gives the example of the property of being west of Central
Park, where “whether one has it depends on how one is geographically situated
with respect to Central Park.” She then argues for the externalist claim that such
relations are analogous to thoughts having a certain content. That is, “[g]iven
externalism, having either the belief that water is wet or other propositional at-
titudes with certain contents would be in some sense analogous to being west of
Central Park, simply because the content type of some such attitudes would su-
pervene on the relations of those who entertain them with their physical and/or
social environments” (Nuccetelli 2003: 3, emphasis in original). This analogy is
of course only illustrative, but it outlines the foundations of externalism in that
it is claimed that even though thoughts are inside a person’s head, their content
supervenes on external factors in the environment of the person who has those
thoughts. Thus, as Ben-Menahem (2005) notes in regard to one of Putnam’s ex-
amples, “to speak of coffee tables it does not suffice for us merely to have the
concept of a coffee table, but we must be in contact with actual coffee tables”
(Ben-Menahem 2005: 10, emphasis in original).
Another analogy is that of sunburn: Davidson (1987) remarks (in the context
of a discussion of meanings and their relations to objects outside of the head)
that “[m]y sunburned skin may be indistinguishable from someone else’s skin
that achieved its burn by other means (our skins may be identical […]); yet one
of us is really sunburned and the other not” (Davidson 1987: 451-452). That is, in
order for one to have the property of being sunburned (to really be sunburned),
one’s skin must have had the proper relationship to the outside environment,
namely, to the sun. Such analogies illustrate the kind of reasoning that lies be-
hind the externalists’ claim that a particular thought or utterance cannot have
a particular meaning unless it has had the proper relation to the outside envi-
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ronment. In other words, according to externalism, content or meaning (or their
individuation), in this case the meaning of sunburn, is in some way essentially
tied to the environment (see Egan 1999 for discussion). Thus, as McGinn (1989:
9-10) remarks, “mind and world are not, according to externalism, metaphysi-
cally independent categories, sliding smoothly past each other. To regard them
as so is to commit oneself to an ‘untenable dualism’, to marking a metaphysical
boundary that does not exist.”
Talk of such relations is systematic and their justification and validity is rarely
explicitly defended. Burge (2003: 466), for example, remarks that “[t]aking ac-
count of language–world relations is part of the way semantics is actually prac-
ticed” and thus there is “no reason to think that there is anything scientifically
wrong or fruitless in studying language–world relations, or with taking them to
be part of the formal structures elaborated in semantical theory.” This has led
to the situation in which relational properties are read into research programs
such as internalism that explicitly deny them. Higginbotham (1991: 556), for ex-
ample, argues that Chomsky’s notion of competence involves “an epistemic rela-
tion between a person and the principles that determine her language.” He argues
against a view he calls representationalism that generative linguists supposedly
hold according to which “having a language just amounts to having a system of
mental representations” and “that one stands in epistemic relations to the princi-
ples of one’s own language” (Higginbotham 1991: 557). Higginbotham complains
that according to this doctrine that he pings on generative linguistics “there is
only a pedantic distinction between representation and represented” (Higgin-
botham 1991: 557). That is, “it conflates questions about what is apprehended,
language, with questions about the means of apprehension.” Analogously, Hig-
ginbotham remarks, “[n]o one confuses the mental representation of a tree with
a tree” and so “[w]hy should it be so common among linguists to write as if
intending to confuse the mental representation of a sentence with a sentence?”
(Higginbotham 1991: 555). In contrast to the representationalism that Higgin-
botham claims conflates the two, he wishes to retain the “philosophical distinc-
tion between language and its representation” (Higginbotham 1991: 558). The
latter distinction encapsulates the E-language conception of language.
There are two questions that, according to Higginbotham, generative linguis-
tics investigates: (i) what is the nature of language? and (ii) what is the relation
between speakers of languages and the languages that they speak? These ques-
tions arise, he says, “if we are interested in a systematic metaphysical view of the
conception of linguistics as a chapter of the cognitive sciences”: “in short, they
are philosophical problems.” Referring to generative linguistics, Higginbotham
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claims that a “popular but confused answer” to the aforementioned questions
“is that languages are systems of mental representation, and that the growth
of competence is the growth of such systems under appropriate environmental
contingencies” (Higginbotham 1991: 555). This answer is confused, according to
Higginbotham, because of the conflation between the mental representation of
language and language itself that rejects the philosophical distinction between
language and its representation.
Despite persistent efforts by Chomsky (1975; 1995; 2000; 2016) and others to
clarify their position, misunderstandings of this sort persist. Devitt (2003; 2006;
2006a) has for years maintained a version of the linguistics is not psychology
argument, arguing forcefully for an epistemological reading of generative lin-
guistics. He claims that “there is a natural interpretation which takes Chomsky
prettymuch at his word” in which the answer to the question of what constitutes
knowledge of language “urges that competent speakers of a language have propo-
sitional knowledge of its rules” and that this “knowledge underlies the speakers’
intuitive judgements about the syntax of expressions” (Devitt 2003: 107-108). This
reading of Chomsky, which Devitt curiously takes to be the natural interpreta-
tion, leads to the conclusion that “there is something theoretically interesting
for a grammar to be true about other than the internal reality of speakers” and
thus the “grammar might be true about a symbolic system, a linguistic reality.”
In other words, Devitt claims that “we can take the grammar realistically with-
out taking it to be true of psychological reality” and that “given the weight of
evidence adduced for a grammar, it is plausible that it is (more or less) true of
linguistic reality” (Devitt 2003: 131, emphasis in original).
The claim that a grammar can be “true of” something other than the inter-
nal structure of the mind originates with Stich (1972), but since then there has
been no clear elucidation of the implication that, as Devitt puts it, evidence from
psychology, psycholinguistics, and the like, “bears on the grammar even with-
out the assumption [that the grammar is psychologically real]” (Devitt 2003: 128,
fn. 28). What does it mean to say that the grammar is linguistically real but is
not in the head? Devitt claims that the grammar is true of a symbolic system,
“a linguistic reality made up of the spoken, written, etc., symbols that speakers
produce” (Devitt 2006a: 483, fn. 5); but what is the nature of this system? De-
vitt takes a grammar to be about a non-psychological realm of expressions, a
realm where physical entities form representational systems that are somehow
distinct from the creatures that use them. Moreover, he claims that “the truth of
a grammar for a language leaves the question of the psychological reality of the
language open” (Devitt 2003: 136). He argues that we should begin with studying
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the grammar’s linguistic reality and that only “in the end we will need to study
the psychological [reality] in order to explain the linguistic [reality]. But in the
beginning we do not” (Devitt 2003: 135). Such an approach is perhaps correct in
regard to well-formed formulae (wffs) in formal logic, where we can study, to
use Devitt’s terminology, the structure rules (the rules governing outputs of a
person’s competence) without consideration, at least initially, of the processing
rules (the rules governing the psychological production of the aforementioned
outputs). Devitt correctly argues that these two rules are very different in regard
to formal logic (the structure rules of formal logic are very different to the pro-
cessing rules of the mind or a computer that govern these outputs), but natural
language does not fit this mould.
Formal languages are invented, natural languages are not. We stipulate the
properties of formal languages to suit particular purposes in logic and mathe-
matics, but in natural languages we do not stipulate but rather discover their
properties. Chomsky (2002) remarks that there is no right answer to questions
such as What are the true rules of formation for well-formed formulas of arith-
metic? or What are the axioms of arithmetic? because, at least in principle, any
set of axioms can generate the theorems in question. Particular axioms are a
particular way of describing the theorems, but not the only way. The same goes
for computer languages: the rules that are chosen to characterise their expres-
sions can be almost anything because they can be implemented on a wide range
of distinct platforms. That is, the expressions themselves are the language, not
the specific computational system that characterises them. In natural language,
however, the reverse is the case. That is:
In natural language there is something in the head, which is the computa-
tional system. The generative system is something real, as real as the liver;
the utterances generated are like an epiphenomenon. This is the opposite
point of view [to that of a computer language or to formal logic]. (Chomsky
2002: 110)
There is thus no analogy between formal languages and natural languages be-
cause in the former one can choose any set of axioms to generate the same the-
orems and it is thus these theorems that are the language. In natural languages,
however, one cannot choose any set of axioms because there is a computational
system in the head with a specific set of axioms or principles, and it is these
principles that are the language. This is because expressions are generated by
a computational system that is the same for all language users (the output of
this generative system varies depending on various factors such as what natu-
ral language is spoken by the community of individual language users, but the
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underlying system that makes this possible is universal). Thus, an explanatory
scientific theory of human language cannot, to use Devitt’s terminology, sepa-
rate psychological reality from linguistic reality, nor can it postulate grammars
that are merely “true of” the speaker but are not internally represented in the
speaker. This is of course an empirical question that could turn out to be wrong,
but we should notmisunderstand the claim of internalist semantics, which explic-
itly postulates a computational procedure that is instantiated in the mind. Devitt
claims that “the grammar is describing the syntactic properties of (idealized) lin-
guistic expressions, certain sounds in the air, inscriptions on paper, and the like”
but that even though these items “are produced by minds” and “presumably get
many of their properties somehow fromminds”, “they are not themselvesmental”
(Devitt 2006: v). If one assumes an E-language perspective, then one can agree
with Devitt that generative linguists conflate a theory of language with a theory
of linguistic competence and that “a person could be competent in a language
without representing it or knowing anything about it: she could be totally igno-
rant of it” (Devitt 2006: 5, emphasis in original). But internalist semantics takes
the I-language perspective and so there is no conflation. Notice that this is not
a matter of terminology: the biolinguistic proposal is an empirical proposal that
could be right or wrong and that will stand or fall on the merits of its explana-
tory fecundity. We should be wary of reading into it epistemological relations
that are explicitly denied.
Why do Soames, Higginbotham, Devitt, and others insist on retaining the dis-
tinction between the mental representation of the language and the language
itself and thus misinterpret internalist semantics as also holding the same dis-
tinction? The answer has to do with their conception of knowledge. From the
I-language perspective the distinction between language itself and its mental rep-
resentation is superfluous: speakers of a particular language do not represent
their language like they would represent some aspects of the external world;
they just have their language (qua I-language). The mental representations pro-
posed by generative linguistics to account for, say, a particular language, are not
about that language; they are that language. This is language understood inten-
sionally in terms of the generative procedure that produces the set of structural
descriptions as opposed to the extensional understanding that sees language as
the set itself that is the output of the generative procedure. Higginbotham is not
satisfied with this because he wants a linguistic theory to explain not only the
properties of language but also how one knows (qua justified true belief) one’s
language. He remarks that the representationalist doctrine, which he reads gen-
erative linguistics as holding, fails when it comes to semantics because ‘“[w]e
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seem to use words with their meaning, when we have only a partial or even a
mistaken conception of what that meaning is” (Higginbotham 1991: 563).
Knowledge of meaning (and language itself), says Higginbotham, “becomes so-
cial whenwe acknowledge others as knowingmore thanwe aboutmeaning, or as
correcting us about meaning, and where our grounds for doing so are cognitively
based.” But if language is social, Higginbotham continues, then the distinctions
“between mental representations and what they represent” and “between what
we think the properties of our language are and what they are in fact” are signif-
icant (Higginbotham 1991: 563). In other words, if you want a linguistic theory
to explain not only the mechanisms in virtue of which language production and
comprehension are possible but also how it is that speakers can misrepresent or
be mistaken about a particular meaning or grammatical feature, then the “lan-
guage with its properties must be distinguished from what the speaker knows
about it” (Higginbotham 1991: 563). This is a clear expression of externalism,
which is “principally a view about the conditions for truth and reference, and
invokes the same considerations whether it is the condition for the truth of a
sentence, or for the truth of a belief is in question” (Farkas 2006: 328).
Notice again that the externalist position conflates two notions of understand-
ing: the notion of understanding that refers to interpreting a sentence as a speaker
of the language (verstehen) and, on the other hand, the notion of understanding
that refers to explaining as in science (erklären) (see Slezak 2004; 2018). This
is clear in Peacocke’s discussion of the “how-questions” in science. He says that
when scientists know that something has a given property, they then look to find
out how is it able to have that property. Peacocke’s how-questions include: “How
is the human body able to avoid waste products building up in the blood?” and
“How is a person able to understand a sentence he has never previously encoun-
tered?” (Peacocke 1994: 315). However, the former question is of a different type
to that of the latter – at least on the usual externalist reading of the latter ques-
tion. But herein lies the problem, for there is an ambiguity in the question “How
is a person able to understand a sentence he has never previously encountered?”:
an ambiguity between understanding qua speaker and understanding qua scien-
tist. It is all too easy to slip in and out of these two very different projects. In
other words, the question “How is a person able to understand a sentence he
has never previously encountered?” can be answered hermeneutically in terms
of interpreting the sentence as a speaker of the language; this is the externalist
approach. But the question can also be answered by taking the internalist ap-
proach and trying to unearth the psychological mechanisms in virtue of which
interpretation is made possible.
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Externalist relational properties and their corresponding how-questions are
of a different type to the scientific how-questions of, say, how certain functions
of the blood operate or, crucially, how a person can comprehend a novel sen-
tence understood scientifically. Peacocke’s discussion is indicative of external-
ism’s conflation of the two types of question. He states that to have “one of the
properties identified in Mendelian genetics is to have a highly relational prop-
erty” and that for a person “to have a recessive gene for red hair” is “something
that involves his relations to hair colour, to other genes (or factors), and to par-
ents and empirically possible descendants” (Peacocke 1994: 315, emphasis mine).
Peacocke assumes that these relational properties are in the same category as
properties in biology in virtue of which genetic explanations are possible. He
claims that Mendelian theory spells out exactly what these relational properties
are. But this assumption is far from obvious, and it’s unclear how a scientific
explanation is at all improved by postulating that a person has certain relations
to their own hair colour or to their genes. One can of course postulate such re-
lations, but not without explaining them fully and unpacking the underlying
assumption that such relations are relevant to fruitful scientific explanations –
for it is this assumption that is doing all the work (as I argue in the next chapter,
this assumption is problematic, for fruitful scientific explanations are mechanis-
tic). This assumption is exemplary of the underlying conflation in the externalist
literature in which externalists erroneously assume that their questions and the-
oretical aims are identical with the questions and theoretical aims of scientists
studying similar phenomena.
3.2 Externalism as a hermeneutic explanatory project
As we have seen, in the founding article of externalism Putnam claimed that “a
better philosophy and a better science of language” must encompass the “social
dimension of cognition” and the “contribution of the environment, other people,
and the world” to semantics (Putnam 1975: 193, emphasis mine). Other external-
ists make similar claims: Paul Horwich (1998; 2005) argues that his externalist
use-based semantics is compatible with a linguistics construed as an empirical
science. Moreover, he says of Davidson’s externalist truth-theoretic program
that it “became widely accepted, instigating several decades of ‘normal science’
in semantics” (Horwich 2001: 371). Davidson himself is somewhat ambivalent,
but still holds that “my own approach to the description, analysis (in a rough
sense), and explanation of thought, language, and action has […] what I take to
be some of the characteristics of a science” (Davidson 1995: 123). And Burge says
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that he sees no reason why formal semantics, which postulates “reference, or
a technical analogue, as a relation between linguistic representations and real
aspects of the world, should not be an area of fruitful systematic scientific in-
vestigation” (Burge 2003: 465). Moreover, Lassiter (2008: 607) claims to have
responded to “Chomsky’s challenge to articulate an externalist theory of mean-
ing that can be used in the scientific investigation of language.”
In order to assess such claims, let us look at a particular externalist theory of
meaning in detail: Davidson’s truth-conditional semantics. Davidson is one of
the most influential philosophers of the second half of the twentieth century, and
his work has had a significant impact not only on philosophy, but also on linguis-
tics and cognitive science. Lepore & Ludwig (2005: viii) remark that “Davidson’s
proposal to use a Tarski-style truth theory as the core of a theory of meaning for
natural languages […] sparked a revolution in philosophical semantics.” David-
son argues that the best way to construct a compositional meaning theory for
natural language is to construct a truth theory (based on the work of the logi-
cian Alfred Tarski) that assigns, from a finite set of axioms, truth conditions to
each sentence of the language. The assignment of truth conditions to the sen-
tences of a natural language is supposed to allow a person to be able to interpret
those sentences. The notion of truth, which for Davidson is “the most obvious
semantic property” and “one of the clearest and most basic concepts we have”
(Davidson 2005: 2, 55), thus acquires a central place in a theory of semantics.
Davidson argues that the meaning of a sentence is its truth conditions. This con-
ception of semantics is so widespread that, as Lepore & Ludwig (2004: 310) point
out, “any approach to the semantics of natural languages is now likely to begin by
stating whether it is based on adopting or rejecting a truth-conditional approach
inspired by Davidson’s work.”
Is a theory of meaning construed in this way compatible with a scientific se-
mantics? Do they have the same aims and explanatory goals? After discussing
Davidsonian truth-conditional semantics I will argue that the answer to these
two questions is negative. My analysis is applicable not only to the Davidso-
nian program, for what I highlight is a symptom of all externalist theories of
meaning. Such attempts fail, I argue, not so much because there is no connec-
tion between the outside world and what is in the head; rather, an externalist
theory of meaning fails because the sort of connection claimed by externalists is
either nonexistent or so amorphous that its attempted systematisation puts into
question a coherent, fruitful and scientific externalist theory of semantics.
In “Truth and meaning”, the classic paper that convinced many philosophers
and linguists of the indispensability of truth conditions in semantics, Davidson
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attempts to construct a compositional theory of meaning that can “give themean-
ing of all expressions in a certain infinite set on the basis of the meaning of the
parts” (Davidson 1967: 305). He stresses the primacy that sentences have in his
theory of meaning and argues (with Frege) that only in the context of a sentence
do words have a meaning. Davidson considers the fruitfulness of using the locu-
tions means that or meanings and concludes that “the one thing that meanings
do not seem to do is oil the wheels of a theory of meaning.” That is, his “objec-
tion to meanings in the theory of meaning is not that they are abstract or that
their identity conditions are obscure, but that they have no demonstrated use”
(Davidson 1967: 307). We saw above that internalist semantics posits that syntax
(broadly conceived) plus a lexicon are sufficient to explain semantics in natu-
ral language. Davidson rejects such a proposal by appealing to “the fact” that
“recursive syntax with dictionary added is not necessarily recursive semantics”
(Davidson 1967: 308). The locutions s means m ormeanings cannot form the basis
of a semantic theory because they cannot be used to provide “for every sentence
s in the language under study, a matching sentence [… that] ‘gives the meaning’
of s” (Davidson 1967: 309). Such locutions, says Davidson, lead us nowhere and
present problems that are as hard as or identical to the problems that a theory
of meaning attempts to solve. Davidson then concludes that the only way to
construct a theory of meaning is to “sweep away the obscure ‘means that’” and
replace it with truth conditions. That is, for a semantic theory to “have done its
work” it must provide for each sentence in the language under study, a matching
sentence that gives the meaning of the former sentence.
Davidson argues that instead of constructing a theory of meaning using such
locutions as s means that p, one must replace themwith the following T-sentence:
“s is T if and only if p”. This schema allows one to translate the sentence s by
replacing the sentence p with a sentence in a metalanguage. Davidson then ar-
gues, augmenting Tarski’s Convention T (Tarski 1956), that “it is clear that the
sentences to which the predicate ‘is T ’ applies will be just the true sentences of
[a language] L” (Davidson 1967: 309). In other words, this proposal amounts to
replacing the locution s means that p with s is true if and only if p. That is, “a the-
ory of meaning for a language L shows ‘how the meanings of sentences depend
upon the meanings of words’ if it contains a (recursive) definition of truth-in-L”,
and thus “to give truth conditions is a way of giving the meaning of a sentence”
(Davidson 1967: 310).
The classic example of what truth definitions look like in a Davidsonian theory
of meaning is the following T-sentence: “Der Schnee ist weiss” is true iff “snow
is white”. Thus, an object language sentence replaces s, and a metalanguage that
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provides conditions under which s is true replaces p. As Lepore & Ludwig (2007:
4) put it, “the key idea of truth-theoretic semantics is that placing certain con-
straints on an axiomatic truth theory will […] put us in a position, knowing that
the theory meets the constraints, to use it to interpret object language sentences
and to see how understanding of them depends on an understanding of their
parts and mode of combination.” Truth-theoretic semanticists at times say that
truth is not supposed to be understood as meaning and that stating conditions
under which the object language is true is not to state what that sentence means.
However, Davidson early on argued that “‘[s]ince a truth definition determines
the truth value of every sentence in the object language (relative to a sentence
in the metalanguage), it determines the meaning of every word and sentence”
(Davidson 1967: 322, fn. 8). But this is just a terminological matter, for the the-
ory is not conceived as a meaning theory per se; but rather as an interpretive
theory that provides “all the knowledge that a compositional meaning theory is
intended to” (Lepore & Ludwig 2004: 317). Davidson thus aims to “sweep away
the obscure ‘means that’” while still retaining the explanatory insights a compo-
sitional meaning theory offers (Davidson 1967: 309).
To summarise, Davidson’s theory includes the following three interrelated
claims: (i) that a theory of meaning for L is a truth-conditional semantics for
L, (ii) that to know the meaning of an expression in L is to know a satisfaction
condition for that expression, and (iii) that meanings are satisfaction conditions.
Horwich (2008: 309) remarks that a version of a truth-theoretic approach to se-
mantics is “widely endorsed amongst both linguists and philosophers”. This con-
ception of semantics is so ingrained that, as Cummins puts it, “it is something
of a challenge to get philosophers of language to realize that The Conjecture [of
Davidson’s] is not obviously true. Generations of philosophers have been trained
to regard The Conjecture as a truism. What else could semantics be? Surely, to
understand an expression, one must know the conditions under which it is satis-
fied!” (Cummins 2002: 153, emphasis in original). Like Horwich but for different
reasons, Cummins is skeptical of truth-theoretic semantics and remarks that “we
are now in a position to see that it is probably false, but I do not expect many
to agree with me about this” (Cummins 2002: 153). He argues that the effect of
taking truth-conditional semantics as a truism meant that much of philosophy
of mind took it upon itself to explain how mental representations could have the
satisfaction conditions that truth-conditional semantics required. In other words,
once you assume “a Davidsonian story about the semantics of natural language,
it is nearly irresistible to conclude that intentional states or mental representa-
tions (or both) must have a truth-conditional semantics as well” (Cummins 2002:
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153).
But this inference from semantics to the nature of mental representation is
problematic, says Cummins, for we have good independent reasons to think that
mental representations do not have a truth-conditional semantics. Cummins dis-
tinguishes two notions of meaning: the first is the communicative meaning of a
term, which is whatever must be in the mind to allow the understanding of the
term. The second is the truth-conditional meaning of a term, which is the term’s
satisfaction condition or its role in generating one in context. Cummins argues
that if one accepts that a constraint on a theory of meaning is that it needs to
explain whatever it is that has to be grasped or possessed for linguistic commu-
nication to be successful, then the mental representations required for linguistic
understanding do not have a truth-conditional semantics. Thus, “a theory of lan-
guage understanding will make no use of truth-conditional semantics”, for “there
is no good reason to think that a truth-conditional semantics for natural language
will have any place in a mature psycholinguistics” (Cummins 2002: 155).
The independent reason Cummins refers to that shows that mental representa-
tions do not have truth conditions is as follows. On the externalist understanding
of meaning, the concept of, say, horse is the mental representation the reference
of which is either horses or the property of being a horse. Cummins rejects this
conception of meaning in favour of the claim that the concept of a horse is “a
body of knowledge loosely identified by its topic. Just as a book about horses
has horses as its topic, but not its referent, so a concept of horses has horses
or the property of being a horse as its topic rather than its referent” (Cummins
2002: 158). A loose analogy to this conception of meaning would be to say that
“a concept (of horses, say) is a theory (of horses), the idea being that theories
are organized bodies of knowledge that we identify in much the way we identify
concepts—viz., by specifying a topic” (Cummins 2002: 158, emphasis in original).
Theories, of course, are identified by their topics not by their referents or satis-
faction conditions, and the same is true in the case of concepts. If we conceive of
concepts as tacit theories, and agree that they are what you need to have in the
mind in order to understand particular terms, then concepts do not semantically
combine in the way that is required by truth-conditional semantics. In other
words, the sort of semantics invoked by “Tarskian combinatorics [is] hopeless
in connection with the sorts of psychological structures concepts must be to do
their jobs” (Cummins 2002: 159).
Cummins argues that truth-conditional semantics is psychologically implau-
sible, for we have independent reasons to think that the content of concepts is
not truth-conditional. But there is a deeper problem with the sort of externalist
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semantics exemplified by Davidson. As Slezak (2014; 2018) discusses, the seman-
tic intuitions of the theorist are in this case relied upon to identify the objects
to be explained by the theory. But this reliance on the intuitions of meaning-
fulness is illegitimate for it relies upon the very mental ability to be explained.
The T-sentence is explicitly invoked as a sentence that is expressed in a theoreti-
cal metalanguage understood by the theorist. Davidson is clear about this when
he remarks that the “inevitable goal of semantic theory is a theory of a natural
language couched in a natural language (the same or another)” (Davidson 1973a:
71), and that “it is one condition on the correctness of a theory of meaning that
it be such that if an interpreter knew it to be true of a speaker, the interpreter
could understand what the speaker said” (Davidson 1995: 131).1 But understand-
ing the language as speaker is implicitly relied upon here in order to make the
explanation work.
The two volume study of truth-theoretic semantics by Lepore & Ludwig (2005;
2007) is very clear about the conception of semantics being an interpretive en-
terprise, and thus as being in direct opposition to the internalist conception of
semantics. As they put it:
An interpretive truth theory shows how we understand complex expres-
sions on the basis of understanding their significant components. But, as
we have said, it does not state how we do it. For the illumination for a par-
ticular language presupposes grasp of another language, the metalanguage,
in which the theory is given. It is through our already grasping a language
which is at least equal in expressive power to the object language, and in
some respects greater (the object language need not have the resources to
give its own truth theory), that we are able to see in detail how the semantic
combinatorics of the object language work. (Lepore & Ludwig 2007: 9)
This should come as no surprise, they say, for “there is no question of a standpoint
for understanding meaning that is outside of language altogether.” That is, “the
most fundamental and powerful devices for representation can obviously not be
explicated without the use of just those devices. We can then at best show how
theywork by showing how they systematically contribute to howwe understand
sentences in which they appear. And there will be no way to do this that does
not mirror the structure of the sentences whose structure we seek to illuminate”
(Lepore & Ludwig 2007: 9).
Riemer (2005; 2010; 2015) also argues that semantics is interpretive. He says
that semantics is a project that is ”essentially hermeneutic” and that it is “a hu-
1 See Slezak (2018) for discussion of these quotes and others.
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manistic discipline closely linked with literary studies” (Riemer 2019: 42-43). It
follows from this that the “subjective character of semantic analysis is irreducible,
and that real empirical progress in all varieties of linguistics is dependent on an
acceptance of this fact” (Riemer 2005: 4). On this view, the irreducibly interpre-
tive character of the study of meaning is due to “the fact that central theoretical
features of the explanation of semantic phenomena have no other justification
than the subjective judgement of the investigators” (Riemer 2005: 3). One might
worry that the inherent subjective character of semantic analysis clashes with
the goals of empiricism, psychological realism, and scientificity in linguistics,
but Riemer argues that analyses of meaning such as those of cognitive semantics
(Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1987; Langacker 1987) “remain genuinely useful
and explanatory – despite, or rather because of, the acknowledged subjectivity
at their core” (Riemer 2005: 4). In other words, if their “explanatory power turns
out not to be a ‘scientific’ one, then so be it”, for such semantic models preserve
“their explanatory value regardless of their ultimate status as ‘science’” (Riemer
2005: 4).
The description of meaning is, according to Riemer, “infinitely less constrained
and more open to varying characterizations than is the description of morphol-
ogy or syntax”, and as a result “semantics has much more to lose by a tolerance
towards alternative descriptions, and runs the risk that any analytical specificity
about the nature of a single meaning/conceptualization will be lost in a scatter of
divergent but equally endorsed analyses” (Riemer 2005: 8). The comparison here
with syntax is revealing, for of course we cannot study syntax hermeneutically
in the same way that we study semantics hermeneutically (there is no meaning
to understand qua speaker in syntax in the same way that there is in semantics).
However, we can study semantics non-hermeneutically. That is, we can study
semantics on the model of syntax, phonology, and morphology. One can agree
with Riemer (2005: 8) that “any meaning is open to a variety of different, often
incompatible, descriptions” and that “the choice of the optimal description is a
prerequisite if the analysis is to attain a minimal degree of empirical specificity”,
but such an argument applies only to semantics construed as a project aimed
at producing meta-linguistic descriptions of meaning. The internalist project dis-
cussed in this book has a different aim, one that is not descriptive but rather
generative in the sense that it explicitly aims to unearth the mechanisms that
are responsible for the generation of meaning. That is, the aim of internalist
semantics is not to provide an optimal description of a particular meaning but
rather to discover the underlying mechanisms that generated that meaning in
the first place. Riemer concludes that semantics is not science because of its irre-
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ducibly interpretive character, and he claims that real empirical progress in all
varieties of linguistics is dependent on an acceptance of this fact. But this is only
the case if semantics is understood hermeneutically, and it fails to acknowledge
that semantics in the internalist and biolinguistic tradition is not understood nor
practiced in this way.
Unlike leading externalists, Riemer recognises that semantics qua hermeneu-
tics is not scientific. Cognitive semantics is inherently interpretive in the same
sense that truth-theoretic semantics is. However, as Slezak (2018) shows, if con-
ceived as a scientific project, truth-theoretic semantics has a fatal explanatory
error, one that is apparent in other domains and that renders such theories ex-
planatorily vacuous from a scientific perspective. The recent study ofQuine and
Davidson by Kemp (2012) comes to the same conclusion. He remarks that the
“bottom line is that the intuition or semantical judgement of the interpreter can-
not be removed from the loop, and thus the theory fails to measure up to the
standards of impersonal science” (Kemp 2012: 12). Davidson’s is a “non-naturalist
standpoint” that is “an unscientific if intuitive standpoint” (Kemp 2012: 12); it is
a pragmatic account that “relies ineliminably on an inarticulate human skill or
art” (Kemp 2012: 143).
Given the above, one would perhaps be content to conceive of truth-theoretic
semantics as a hermeneutic project, but what is one tomake of Davidson’s procla-
mations to the contrary? As noted above, he remarks that “my own approach to
the description, analysis (in a rough sense), and explanation of thought, language,
and action has […] what I take to be some of the characteristics of a science”
(Davidson 1995: 123). Moreover, his unified theory of speech and action (of which
his theory of meaning is part) “presents a clear and precise formal structure with
demonstrable merits”, and it does so “like any scientific theory” (Davidson 1995:
126). Davidson takes his theory to be a psychological theory, but he hedges his
bets by saying that whether “the features of a psychological theory I have been
rehearsing […] show that a psychological theory is so different from a theory in
the natural sciences as not to deserve to be called a science I do not know, nor
much care.” What he is “sure of is that such a theory, though it may be as genuine
a theory as any, is not in competition with any natural science” (Davidson 1995:
134). Here and elsewhere Davidson is clearly ambivalent about the scientific aims
of his theory, but as we’ll see in the next chapter there are plenty of externalists
(both Davidsonians and not) who unambiguously claim their project to have the
same explanatory aims as scientific pursuits like cognitive psychology.
What is going on here? On the one hand, we have claims that “[e]xternalism
sets limits to how complete psychological explanation can be, since it introduces
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into the heart of the subject elements that no psychological theory can pretend
to explain.” But on the other hand, “this feature in itself makes psychological
theory no less scientific than volcanology, biology, meteorology, or the theory
of evolution” (Davidson 1995: 129-130). Davidson at times claims that there is a
fundamental difference in aims and interests between his theory and Chomsky’s
in that he is not trying to understand and explain the same phenomena. Yet at
other times he explicitly conceives of his externalist theory as psychological and
scientific. If Slezak (2018) is right, then Davidson’s truth-theoretic semantics is
a specific and revealing example of an explanatory theory that relies on the in-
ner abilities it purports to explain. But conceiving of Davidsonian semantics as
a hermeneutic project shields it from such criticism, for we can understand each
other in a hermeneutic manner as speakers of a language and not as theorists of
language in the scientific sense. As noted above, there are two senses of under-
standing here that are often conflated. One sense of understanding language is
the project that takes semantics to be essentially hermeneutic, as a largely hu-
manistic discipline. The other sense is the scientific or psychological sense qua
internalist semantics.2
It is noteworthy that late in their careers, bothQuine and Davidson acknowl-
edged the affinities between their Analytical philosophical methods, attitudes
and traditions and that of the hermeneutic and Continental project (see Slezak
2018 for quotes and discussion). This affinity is explicit in Malpas (2011), which is
a collection of leading scholars reflecting on Davidson’s work. In the book’s fore-
word, Dagfinn Føllesdal writes that it is “easy to connect him [Davidson] with
the hermeneutic tradition, particularly with the new hermeneutics, Heidegger
and Gadamer and their followers” (xii).
2 See Riemer (2019) for evidence that cognitive linguistics makes the same conflation.
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4 The science of semantics: Aims,
methods, and aspirations
In this concluding chapter I link the discussion of internalist and externalist se-
mantics with a discussion of what scientific explanations look like in general. I
argue that a fruitful scientific explanation is one that aims to uncover the underly-
ing mechanisms in virtue of which the observable phenomena are made possible,
and that a scientific semantics should be doing just that. If this is so, then a sci-
ence of semantics is unlikely to be an externalist one, for reasons having to do
with the subject matter and form of externalist theories.
I should make clear at the outset that even though I argue that externalism is
a hermeneutic project and thus not a scientific one, my criticism should not be
taken to be dismissive of the hermeneutic approach to semantics. The hermeneu-
tic approach has provided and continues to provide great insight into the use of
language in human social interaction, but this book is concerned with what a
science of semantics should look like. My criticism is thus not aimed at exter-
nalists per se but rather at those of them who claim to be part of the scientific
project. Considering the latter type of externalists, one should of course judge
their theories by the same standards as internalist theories (and scientific theo-
ries in general). In other words, taking for granted the claim by both sides to
be doing science, the real interest in the externalism/internalism debate comes
when one considers which questions, aims, and theoretical interests are more
likely to produce a fruitful explanatory scientific semantics.
4.1 The nature of scientific explanations
What follow are some remarks on the nature of scientific explanation. I argue
that the aims and practices of externalism are orthogonal to those of cognitive
psychology. The main reason for this is that, unlike the externalist approach, a
fruitful scientific explanation is one that aims to uncover the underlying mech-
anisms in virtue of which the observable phenomena are made possible. I first
unpack this view of scientific explanation, and then offer some remarks on the
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implication of this view for externalism.
One can make the strong claim that many scientific explanatory theories –
perhaps all but physics – follow what Thagard (2012) refers to as the mechanista
view of scientific method, according to which to explain a phenomenon is to un-
earth the mechanism that produces it. Fodor (1968) and Cummins (1975; 1983)
are early versions of this sort of approach to explanation. It has been developed
more recently by, among others, Bechtel & Richardson (1993), Glennan (1996),
Machamer, Darden & Craver (2000), Craver (2007), and Bechtel (2009), though
this conception goes back to Descartes and Boyle (see Bechtel 2011 for discus-
sion). On this view, the aim of science is the discovery of mechanisms rather
than laws. Machamer, Darden & Craver (2000) argue that much of the practice
of science can be understood in this way. Mechanisms, according to them, are
“identified and individuated by the activities and entities that constitute them,
by their start and finish conditions, and by their functional roles” (Machamer,
Darden & Craver 2000: 6). A mechanism is defined by them as a regular series
of activities of entities that bring about a particular phenomenon. The emphasis
here is on what the activities of mechanisms produce, rather than merely on the
changes in the properties of the mechanisms. The construal of scientific explana-
tion in terms of the unearthing of mechanisms is a different project to that of the
discovery of laws. In fact, subsumption under law is a misunderstanding of how
fruitful scientific explanation works (see Cummins 2000). Machamer, Darden &
Craver (2000: 8) give an example from biology according to which if a single
base were changed in DNA and the mechanism of protein synthesis operated
as usual, then a counterfactual would be supported. “No philosophical work is
done,” they say, “by positing some further thing, a law, that underwrites the pro-
ductivity of activities.” Activities are constitutive of mechanisms, and it is they
that make phenomena intelligible. In other words, the intelligibility consists “in
mechanisms being portrayed in terms of a field’s bottom out entities and activi-
ties” (Machamer, Darden & Craver 2000: 21). So it is not regularities or laws that
explain. Rather, what does the explaining are the mechanisms in virtue of which
the observed regularities are made possible.
It should be noted that mechanistic explanations are not reductive explana-
tions – one cannot use them to deductively predict from a lower level what will
occur at a higher level. The decomposition into mechanisms (and into mecha-
nisms of mechanisms) preserves the higher levels, and indeed a mechanistic ex-
planationwould be incomplete without a hierarchy of levels. In otherwords, mul-
tiple levels are required in order to properly explain a particular phenomenon,
and it is the integration of different levels that makes phenomena intelligible.
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Moreover, it is striking that despite its apparent prevalence, mechanistic expla-
nation was largely ignored in the philosophy of science in the twentieth century.
Bechtel (2009) shows how biologists and psychologists rarely make use of laws
in giving explanations, and in the relatively few cases in which they do the laws
tend to be those of physics or chemistry (see also Bechtel 2008; Bechtel & Abra-
hamsen 2005). In the case of biology, say, there is an “ubiquity of references
to mechanism” and a “sparseness of references to laws” (Bechtel & Abraham-
sen 2005: 423). Cummins (2000: 140) speaks of the scandal in regard to the
widespread belief that scientific explanation is subsumption under law: “Laws
tell us what the mind does, not how it does it. We want to know how the mind
works, not just what it does.” He gives the example of the McGurk Effect in psy-
chology: “no one thinks that theMcGurk effect explains the data it subsumes”, no
one “would suppose that one could explain why someone hears a consonant like
the speaking mouth appears to make by appeal to the McGurk effect”; this is be-
cause that “just is the McGurk effect” (Cummins 2000: 119, emphasis in original).
In other words, laws describe the data, they do not explain the data.
Bechtel & Abrahamsen (2005) discuss how the identification of phenomena in
biology precedes their explanation. There is a sense in which there is no other
way to go about scientific explanation – we cannot know in advance what it is
that needs explaining. Asking the right questions in science is an important part
of what makes a particular explanatory theory successful. In cognitive psychol-
ogy, identifying phenomena of, say, behavioural dispositions or of language use
precedes their theoretical explanation. We of course need to know what it is that
humans are doing when they use language, but that is not an explanation – it
is a description. What we have in externalist theories is a description of regu-
larities and “laws” of language use or of behaviour. There is much debate about
ascription, about what a particular behaviour or linguistic output should be la-
belled as. But regardless of the value and interest of such descriptions – and it
is far from nil – such theories are not fruitful explanatory theories: they are the
explananda, not the explanantia. To conceive of the externalist research project
as scientific – specifically, as having the same aims as cognitive psychology and
internalist semantics – is a misunderstanding that fails to see the force and value
of hermeneutic research. Investigating the way in which words are individuated
and the way in which social norms come into play when people use language,
amongst other topics, is a valuable and interesting project. But this tells us little
about the mechanisms in virtue of which such language use is made possible. An-
other way to put the matter is as follows. Hermeneutic research does not explain
the underlying mechanisms of language but rather uses them to investigate the
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world via language. Internalism, on the other hand, takes its subject matter to be
the underlying mechanisms themselves, not their use.
Externalism is a hermeneutic project in which linguistic abilities are used in
the investigation of the world. Its methods are ill-suited to the investigation of
those underlying mechanisms of language use, for that leads to explanatory vac-
uousness in which the abilities that are purportedly being explained are relied
upon implicitly. The next section is devoted to showing in detail that if external-
ism is understood as science then it indeed leads to such illegitimate reliance on
the very phenomenon to be explained.
4.2 Externalism and scientific explanations
As noted above, there are a number of leading externalists who explicitly con-
ceive their projects to be scientific ones. Horwich, for example, says of David-
son’s externalist truth-theoretic program that it “became widely accepted, insti-
gating several decades of ‘normal science’ in semantics” (Horwich 2001: 371).
Despite the immense popularity of truth-theoretic semantics, Horwich is one of
a handful of critics within the externalist camp that have called into question
the concept of truth as a basis for a semantic theory. Their deflationary theory
of truth argues that to assert that a particular sentence is true is equivalent to
merely asserting the sentence on its own. That is, the claim is that asserting the
sentence “‘snow is white’ is true” is equivalent to merely asserting that snow is
white. In other words, “[o]ur use and grasp of the concept of truth is adequately
explained by our tendency […] to accept <A> is true when, and only when, we
are prepared to accept A” (Armour-Garb & Beall 2005: 12, emphasis in original).
Deflationists argue that in order to understand a concept one must consider its
function, and therefore in order “to understand what truth is, we must consider
what truth does” and “consideration of what it does reveals that it has no un-
derlying nature or structure at all – there is nothing to truth” (Armour-Garb &
Beall 2005: 17, emphasis in original). The deflationary account thus precludes the
analysis of the nature of meaning in terms of truth conditions.
The deflationary alternative to truth-theoretic semantics, however, is still an
externalist account of semantics. It is worth looking at this alternative, for it
shows that the problems with truth-theoretical theories of meaning are due to
their externalist conception of meaning and not due to their truth-theoretical
formal apparatus. Horwich’s use-based semantics, whilst not truth-theoretical,
is still externalist and suffers from similar problems if construed as a cognitive
psychological scientific project. Horwich argues that his use-based semantics,
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essentially a defence of Wittgenstein’s idea of a use theory of meaning, is com-
patible with a linguistics construed as an empirical science, but the reasons for
rejecting this claim are the same as the reasons for rejecting any externalist the-
ory of meaning if one wishes to construct a fruitful scientific semantics.
Horwich is critical of mainstream formal semantics and argues that “as far as
explaining our linguistic activity is concerned, there is no reason at all to think
that understanding has a truth theoretic basis” (Horwich 2008: 318). He claims
that while the problems truth-theoretic semantics presents “are highly challeng-
ing, requiring considerable skill and ingenuity, and that enormous progress has
been made in these endeavours over the last forty years or so”, citing “such
progress is not enough to vindicate truth-theoretic semantics as an empirical
subject, as an integral part of the global scientific enterprise” (Horwich 2008:
318, fn. 12, emphasis in original). He argues that in order to be a part of science,
truth-theoretic semantics must show how their derivations have contributed to
the explanation of observable events. However, “that has not, and cannot, be
done” (Horwich 2008: 318). His main objection has to do with composition-
ality and the assumption of formal semanticists that “the project of semantics
needs to start […] with theoretical assumptions about the meanings of sentences”
(Horwich 2008: 314, emphasis in original). As we saw above, truth-theoretic se-
mantics is an analysis that focuses on sentences. As Lepore & Ludwig (2007: 4)
put it, the “goal is not to provide an analysis of the concept of meaning, or an
analysis piecemeal of particular words or what it is for someone to understand
them, but to illuminate as a whole the set of concepts deployed in understand-
ing other speakers by considering how one could confirm such a theory on the
basis of evidence described without appeal to those concepts.” Horwich takes
the opposite approach, for he believes that compositionality is relatively easy to
accommodate and thus one needs to first “somehow identify […] the theoretical-
meanings of words, and then, presupposing compositionality, to trivially deduce
the theoretical-meanings of sentences” (Horwich 2008: 314, emphasis in origi-
nal).
Inverting the focus of semantics from sentences to words, says Horwich, has
the effect of nullifying truth-theoretic semantics, for truth conditions apply to
sentences and cannot apply towords. Given this focus onwords, Horwich argues
that the theoretical characterisation of the meanings of words will be deduced
from “certain facts concerning sentence usage, rather than sentence meaning”
(Horwich 2008: 314, emphasis in original). That is, once the meanings of words
are deduced from observations of sentence usage, “we will – in light of composi-
tionality – be able to arrive […] at the meanings of sentences.” Thus, according
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to Horwich’s use-based semantics and pace Davidson, “it will be trivially easy to
deduce what any sentence means from the structure of that sentence and what
its words mean” (Horwich 2008: 314). A simple example of Horwich’s use-based
semantics is the following:
Presumably our understanding of the sentence “dogs bark” arises somehow
from our understanding of its components and our appreciation of how they
are combined. That is to say, “dogs bark” somehow gets its meaning (or, at
least, one of its meanings) from the meanings of the two words “dog” and
“bark”, from the meaning of the generalization schema “ns v”, and from the
fact that the sentence results from placing those words in that schema in a
certain order. (Horwich 1998: 154)
So on this account the meaning of the sentence dogs bark is deduced by com-
bining a word meaning dog with a word meaning barks. Therefore, according to
Horwich, understanding complex expressions is nothing over and above under-
standing their parts and knowing how they are combined. This is what he means
when he claims that compositionality is a relatively trivial matter. Knowing the
meanings of words and being aware of their mode of combination is all that is
required, says Horwich, in order to understand the meanings of sentences: “No
further work is required; no further process needs to be involved, leading from
those initial conditions to the state of understanding the sentence” (Horwich
1998: 155).
It might seem that Horwich’s account is compatible with an internalist se-
mantics, for the latter also claims that all that is required for the explanation
of sentence meaning is the primitive lexical elements and the syntax defining
the ways in which they can be combined. But the way in which the primitives
are explained in internalist semantics is very different to Horwich’s use-based
account. Horwich is critical of truth-theoretic semantics because he thinks it
lacks the necessary explanatory power. That is, he says, the observable events
that are of interest to semantics are “items of verbal activity – both mental and
behavioural”, and semantics “is obliged to explain […] facts concerning the cir-
cumstances in which sentences are accepted” (Horwich 2008: 315, emphasis in
original). But truth-theoretic semantics cannot sufficiently explain such facts
and is thus a failed enterprise: it cannot (but it must, says Horwich) “tell us what
it is about, e.g., ‘The sky is blue’ that explains why it tends to be recognized as
true if and only if it is true” (Horwich 2008: 317, emphasis in original).
This is clearly still an externalist semantic theory, for even though it rejects
truth conditions it claims that “the underlying basis of each word’s meaning is
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the (idealized) law governing its usage— a law that dictates the ‘acceptance con-
ditions’ of certain specified sentences containing it” (Horwich 2005: 26). This law
of acceptance conditions, argues Horwich, solves the puzzle of why it is thatThe
sky is blue tends to be recognised as true. The law would stipulate, for example,
that the meaning of red “stems from the fact that its law of use is a propensity to
accept ‘That is red’ in response to the sort of visual experience normally provoked
by observing a clearly red surface” or that “‘and’ means what it does because the
fundamental regularity in its use is our acceptance of the two-way argument
schema, ‘p, q // p and q’” (Horwich 2005: 26). The law of acceptance conditions,
which is supposed to underwrite Horwich’s semantic theory, is explicitly under-
stood to be on par with a linguistics construed as an empirical science. But as
we’ll now see, laws of this kind are problematic at best.
Horwich argues that the phenomena that semantics needs to explain are those
of sentence acceptance. He elaborates: “I don’t mean ‘accepted as grammatical’,
but ‘accepted as true’, i.e., ‘in the belief-box’. Acceptance sometimes leads to ut-
terance (depending on the speaker’s desires); therefore explaining the acceptance
of a sentence may contribute to explain its being uttered” (Horwich 2008: 315, fn.
9, emphasis in original). Sentence acceptance is explained by the following:
The meaning of a word, w, is engendered by the non-semantic feature of
w that explains w’s overall deployment. And this will be an acceptance-
property of the following form:— “that such-and-such w-sentences are reg-
ularly accepted in such-and-such circumstances” is the idealized law gov-
erning w’s use is [sic] (by the relevant “experts”, given certain meanings
attached to various other words). (Horwich 2005: 28)
According to the use theory of meaning, then, a word means what it does “in
virtue of its basic use; a word’s use is responsible for its meaning what it does.
Thus, not only does a meaning-property supervene on a basic acceptance prop-
erty, but possession of the former is immediately explained by possession of the
latter” (Horwich 2005: 32, emphasis in original).
Horwich argues that insofar as “linguistics is an empirical science – standing
alongside psychology, neurology, biology, physics, etc.”, then such acceptance-
laws “should be testable against concrete observable events” (Horwich 2008: 315).
Thus, “the semanticist of a given language ought to be looking, concerning each
word, for the basic law governing its use” (Horwich 2008: 319), and if such laws
are forthcoming and explanatorily fruitful, Horwich believes that “[s]emantics
would then somewhat resemble fundamental physics” (Horwich 2008: 318). The
phenomena of sentence acceptance is supposed to cohere with phonology, syn-
tax, and pragmatics to yield a science of language use. Horwich argues that
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truth-theoretic semantics cannot yield such a science but that his use-based se-
mantics can. However, both are problematic if construed as science. One problem
with sentence acceptance, a main tenet of Horwich’s theory, is that it is unclear
whether it can be generalised beyond the examples that Horwich gives. As Schif-
fer (2000) argues, meaning-constituting properties are supposed to be acceptance
properties, but it is not even clear whether relatively simple words like dog have
acceptance properties. As he puts it, there are no plausible candidates for “a kind
of ‘dog’-containing sentence K and a kind of circumstance C such that a speaker
for whom ‘dog’ means dog will be disposed to accept a sentence of kind K in
circumstances of kind C, and that fact will belong to the explanation of his ac-
cepting any other sentence that contains ‘dog’” (Schiffer 2000: 534). For instance,
“‘[d]og’ may mean dog for someone who is blind or who does not know what
a dog looks like, so it cannot be required that anyone who understands ‘dog’
must be disposed to accept ‘That’s a dog’ when confronted with a paradigm dog”
(Schiffer 2000: 534).
Even granting the validity of acceptance properties, it is unclear whether sen-
tence meaning can be reduced to sentence acceptance because the latter involves
much more than what is traditionally thought of as sentence meaning. Consider
the following example from Gupta (1993). Suppose that a predicate G has the fol-
lowing stipulative definition: a thing is G if and only if it is red and round. Given
the close connection between the acceptance properties and meaning properties
of G, it may appear that the two can be regarded as the same thing. But such
a definition, argues Gupta, may play only a minimal role in the explanation of
a person’s acceptance of sentences containing G. The fundamental role in such
an explanation may be played by, for example, the authority of some expert (if,
say, the person trusts the expert’s colour reports). There is thus “little reason to
think […] that ‘explanatorily basic patterns [of sentence acceptance]’” in Hor-
wich’s use theory of meaning “provide the meaning of a word”, for “plainly, the
acceptance of sentences depends not just on the meanings of words but also on
the methods of obtaining information (and misinformation) about the world.” In
other words, “we should distinguish general ideas such as ‘meaning is use’ and
‘meaning explains use’ fromHorwich’s particular claim. The former may express
truisms, the latter does not” (Gupta 1993: 666) (see also Gupta 2003).
Gupta’s remark that the acceptance of sentences depends not just on themean-
ings of words but also on the methods of obtaining information about the world
hints at the main reasonwhy externalist theories such as Horwich’s cannot serve
as a foundation upon which to construct a science of semantics: such theories
have a problematic choice of subject matter. The scope of semantic theories was
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discussed by Katz & Fodor (1963) in the early days of internalist semantics and
it’s worth briefly revisiting here, for it bears directly on the problems with the
scope of externalist theories of meaning. Katz and Fodor ask the reader to com-
pare the following three sentences: Should we take junior back to the zoo? Should
we take the lion back to the zoo? Should we take the bus back to the zoo? They
then remark that, for example, “[i]nformation which figures in the choice of the
correct readings for these sentences includes the fact that lions, but not children
and busses, are often kept in cages.” After listing a handful of other examples,
they note that the “reader will find it an easy matter to construct an ambiguous
sentence whose resolution requires the representation of practically any item of
information about the world he chooses.” But “a complete theory of setting selec-
tion must represent as part of the setting of an utterance any and every feature
of the world which speakers need in order to determine the preferred reading
of that utterance”, and “practically any item of information about the world is
essential to some disambiguations” (Katz & Fodor 1963: 179). If this is so then a
number of conclusions follow.
The first conclusion is that a theory that insists (as externalism does) on in-
cluding the mind’s relations to the external world in a theory of language cannot
hope to find reliable relations of this sort (let alone systematising them into a
fruitful explanatory theory). Second, as Katz and Fodor note, “such a theory can-
not in principle distinguish between the speaker’s knowledge of his language
and his knowledge of the world, because, according to such a theory, part of the
characterization of a linguistic ability is a representation of virtually all knowl-
edge about the world that speakers share” (Katz & Fodor 1963: 179, emphasis in
original). Thirdly, Katz and Fodor remark that “since there is no serious possibil-
ity of systematizing all the knowledge of the world that speakers share, and since
a theory of the kind we have been discussing requires such a systematization, it
is ipso facto not a serious model for semantics” (Katz & Fodor 1963: 179). The
same is true of externalism. Moreover, despite the efforts of Horwich and others,
due to the creative aspect of language use there is little chance of constructing a
science of language use (Chomsky 1966; McGilvray 2001; 2005; Asoulin 2013).
But there is a deeper reason. The laws of language use, if they can be formu-
lated at all, at best tell us what a language user does, they do not tell us why that
is the case nor explain the underlying ability to do so. It is the latter that science
seeks to uncover. Scientific laws describe the data in question, not explain the
data. As Cummins (2000) discusses, there is now a consensus that the deduc-
tive nomological (DN) sense in which laws are explanatory is a myth and that
“the suspicion grows that it cannot be done successfully” because there is no dif-
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ference between laws and data: “No laws are explanatory in the sense required
by DN” (Cummins 2000: 119, emphasis in original). Cummins (2000: 120) quips
that in psychology “we are overwhelmed with things to explain, and somewhat
underwhelmed by things to explain them with.” The same is true of theories
of meaning that take an externalist approach but still claim to be psychologi-
cal or non-hermeneutic. We are indeed overwhelmed with things to explain in
externalism: phenomena of meaning ascription, sentence acceptance properties,
truth-evaluable judgements and the like are fascinating phenomena of language
use. But they are data of language use, not scientific explanations of language use.
This conflation, according to Cummins, “derives from a deep-rooted uncertainty
about what it would take to really explain a psychological effect” (Cummins 2000:
121).
We saw above that Horwich claims that if the science of semantics is done
the way he proposes then semantics would ”somewhat resemble fundamental
physics” (Horwich 2008: 318), but this reflects the very conflation that Cummins
points to. Let us see why. Semantics cannot resemble fundamental physics any
more than geology can, for they are what Fodor (1974) famously called special
sciences. Unlike fundamental physics, the special sciences do not yield general
laws of nature but only “laws governing the special sorts of systems that are
their proper objects of study.” Laws of psychology are laws in situ, which “spec-
ify effects—regular behavioral patterns characteristic of a specific kind of mech-
anism” (Cummins 2000: 121). But notice the crucial difference here: the laws in
question describe the effects of the specific kind of mechanism which is their sub-
ject matter. But in order to move from a description to an explanation we need
an account of the mechanism itself. Notice that this is not the case at the level
of fundamental physics, where “laws are what you get because, at a fundamental
level, all you can do is say how things are.” That is, the “things that obey the
fundamental laws of motion (everything) do not have some special constitution
or organization that accounts for the fact that they obey those laws” because
the “laws of motion just say what motion is in this possible world” (Cummins
2000: 122, emphasis in original). As Cummins argues (Cummins 1975; 1983; 2010;
Roth & Cummins 2014), special sciences like psychology (and, of course, like a
semantics construed as science) “should seek to discover and specify the effects
characteristic of the systems that constitute their proprietary domains, and to ex-
plain those effects in terms of the structure of those systems, that is, in terms of
their constituents (either physical or functional) and their mode of organization”
(Cummins 2000: 122, emphasis in original).
I would like to briefly return to the discussion of Davidon’s truth-theoretic
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semantics to show that the problematic nature of the explanations in use-based
semantics qua scientific explanations is also present in the Davidsonian program
(and, indeed, in any externalist theory of meaning of this sort). Lepore and Lud-
wig remark that the “centrepiece and nexus of Davidson’s philosophy” is the
project of the radical interpreter, and that “the stance of the radical interpreter
of another speaker [… is] methodologically basic in understanding language and
connected matters” (Lepore & Ludwig 2005: viii, 2). This stance stems from the
problem confronting linguists constructing a grammar of a language they do not
yet understand. The problem is how to choose amongst competing theories of
meaning for the language under investigation. In other words, “given a theory
that would make interpretation possible, what evidence plausibly available to a
potential interpreter would support the theory to a reasonable degree?” (David-
son 1973: 125). Davidson claims that the problem of interpretation is “domestic as
well as foreign: it surfaces for speakers of the same language in the form of the
question, how can it be determined that the language is the same?” (Davidson
1973: 125). That is, even in cases of everyday communication by speakers of the
same language, the speakers are in a sense theorising interpreters. Two speak-
ers of English, say, who successfully communicate to each other are thus each
possessors of a theory of interpretation.
Davidson takes his theory of meaning to model what interpreters are doing in
this form of theorising, and he thus uses the terms interpretation and understand-
ing as if they were interchangeable (see Mulhall 1987). A meaning theory, says
Davidson, must allow the interpreter “to understand any of the infinity of sen-
tences the speaker might utter” in the language (Davidson 1973: 127), and thus
“someonewho knows the theory can interpret the utterances to which the theory
applies” (Davidson 1973: 128). The theory Davidson has in mind, of course, is a
truth-theoretic theory of meaning, and thus the project of the radical interpreter
becomes that of “confirming a truth theory for a speaker’s language that can be
used to interpret correctly the speaker’s utterances” (Lepore & Ludwig 2005: 3).
As already noted, this is a conflation of understanding as speaker and under-
standing as theorist. The project of the radical interpreter that aims at construct-
ing a compositional meaning theory for a natural language is a hermeneutic
project of interpretation because it takes for granted the underlying mechanisms
of language. If we take scientific explanations as seeking to unearth the mecha-
nisms responsible for the observed phenomena, then truth-theoretic semantics
leaves unexplained the abilities it purports to explain. Davidson’s truth-theoretic
semantics is a case in point in regard to an externalist approach being ill suited to
a scientific semantics. The conflation of the two senses of understanding arises
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in part from the often implicit assumption that the investigation of the under-
lying mechanisms will not be philosophically illuminating. As Davidson notes
in regard to his theory: “The point of the theory was not to describe how we
actually interpret, but to speculate on what it is about thought and language that
makes them interpretable.” Furthermore, he remarks that “[a]ll that is lacking
at the start [of constructing a theory of meaning] is a shared language and prior
knowledge of each other’s attitudes.” Therefore, since “the theory and the official
story of how it can be applied are already remote from actual practice, we must
expect that the theory will throw only the most oblique light on the acquisition
of a first language, and less still on the origins of speech” (Davidson 1995: 128).
Such statements clearly distinguish Davidson’s project from the internalist (and
biolinguistic) project. It is clear that Davidson does not attempt to explain the
mechanisms that underlie language production and comprehension, for his the-
ory explicitly assumes a shared language and prior knowledge of other people’s
propositional attitudes.
The quest to construct an interpretive truth theory is seen by Davidsonians
as the distinguishing mark of a semantic theory: this sets the subject area of
their theory apart from an internalist theory of meaning that seeks to explain
the very abilities that externalist theories use in constructing their own theories.
Davidson (1995: 133) is explicit about this:
I want to know what it is about propositional thought – our beliefs, de-
sires, intentions, and speech – that makes them intelligible to others. This
is a question about the nature of thought and meaning which cannot be
answered by discovering neural mechanisms, studying the evolution of the
brain, or finding evidence that explain the incredible ease and rapidity with
which we come to have a first language.
In other words, the nature of the underlying mechanisms by which language
is acquired, produced, and comprehended in the heads of speakers cannot be
unearthed via the radical interpreter project. If this is so, then Davidson’s claims
that his project is scientific displays the conflation between the two senses of
understanding (verstehen and erklären).
Another way to understand the conflation is by considering the difference
between a traditional grammar and a generative grammar. This is the distinc-
tion between, on the one hand, a descriptive or interpretive theory of language
and, on the other hand, an explanatory theory of language qua science. The
latter is a grammar in the I-language sense, which is an account of the ideal
speaker/hearer’s competence. Furthermore, “[i]f the grammar is […] perfectly
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explicit – in other words, if it does not rely on the intelligence of the under-
standing reader but rather provides an explicit analysis of his contribution – we
may (somewhat redundantly) call it a generative grammar” (Chomsky 1965: 4,
emphasis in original). Recall that a generative grammar is understood inten-
sionally, meaning that it focuses on the specific procedure encoded in the mind
that generates the strings of the language (as opposed to the E-language concep-
tion that focusses on the strings themselves). A generative grammar is distinct
from both an E-language grammar and a traditional prescriptive grammar. Tra-
ditional grammars describe how a particular language is or should be used. How-
ever, as Chomsky (1980: 237) remarks, traditional grammars “do not provide an
analysis of the qualities of intelligence that the reader brings to bear on the in-
formation presented.” The same is true in the case of externalist theories such
as truth-theoretic semantics. Traditional descriptive grammars and interpretive
truth-theoretic theories ofmeaning, whatever theirmerits (and one should not be
dismissive of their accomplishments), provide only examples and hints as to the
underlying nature of the language. That is, the success of traditional grammars
(and the success of externalist semantics) rests entirely on their pairing with “an
intelligent and comprehending reader” (Chomsky 1962: 528). Indeed, the remark
of Chomsky (1962: 529) almost 60 years ago that “[r]eliance on the reader’s in-
telligence is so commonplace that its significance may easily be overlooked”, is
still pertinent today in the case of externalist theories of meaning.
My criticism of descriptive or interpretive theories of language does not stem
from the claim that they omit certain facts. Considering their subject matter,
such theories haven’t left out the mechanisms in the head in virtue of which
language is made possible, for that is not their aim. From the perspective of sci-
entific explanations, however, they give an incomplete picture of the nature of
language because they assume, indeed they build upon and would be unusable
without, the abilities of language users. It is this ability on which internalism
and biolinguistics would like to shed light. Lepore & Ludwig (2005: 11) appear to
concur when they remark that “Davidson treats compositional meaning theories
as empirical theories, theories of particular speakers or natural languages, which
must be confirmed on the basis of public evidence.” These theories belong “in the
context of a theory of interpretation of human action in general”, and thus “from
this perspective, the role of a theory of interpretation is to identify and system-
atize patterns in the behaviour of speakers in relation to their environment.”
***
Fodor (2000a: 21) notes approvingly in regard to the modern form of the rep-
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resentational theory of mind that it has “shed a feature that traditional versions
of the doctrine, rationalist and empiricist, invariably took for granted: that RTP
[representational theory of perception] must provide not just a psychology of
perception but an epistemology, too.” Fodor distinguishes what psychology does,
which is, among others, to explain the mechanisms that underpin belief fixation,
from what epistemology does, which is, among others, to investigate whether
one is justified in having a particular belief or meaning, or whether one’s par-
ticular representation of, say, an object in the world, is a true representation or
a misrepresentation. He refers to the attempt to incorporate within one theory
both how one has a particular visual perception and how one is justified in be-
lieving that particular visual perception as a “double burden” and as the core
of what was wrong with the traditional representational theories of perception.
However, Fodor fails to see that this same double burden is carried by externalist
theories of meaning such as his own.
A different double burden in regard to theories of meaning is discussed by
Lepore (1983; 1983a), who argues that the problem of how to characterise what is
in the speaker’s head is a “non-issue” (Lepore 1983: 185, fn. 5). That is, the problem
of unearthing the underlying mechanisms of language in the head “arises only
if, as many do, one views semantics as a subfield of psychology.” In other words,
“[i]f we assume that questions about knowledge and understanding of language
are psychological questions, then semantics should be a subfield of psychology.”
Lepore disagrees with this conception of semantics and argues for an externalist
conception according to which semantics “properly understood, is not a subfield
of psychology but of epistemology.” Thus, he concludes, since semantics and
questions about knowledge and understanding of language are not psychological
questions but are instead epistemological questions, “we need not worry about
what’s in the speaker’s head – whatever that may mean” (Lepore 1983: 185, fn. 5).
If the goals of a theory of meaning are understood as part of epistemology, then
perhaps one can make the case that psychology is beside the point. But if this is
the case then what is one to make of the claims of Burge, Davidson, Fodor, and
Horwich that their externalist theories of meaning are scientific? In other words,
if psychology aims to discover the mechanisms in virtue of which language is
made possible, and if that means that psychology is part of science, then, pace
Lepore, if one’s research program is scientific then we do need to worry about
what’s in the head, we do need to have a semantics that is informed by (and in
turn informs) cognitive psychology.
Either an externalist theory of meaning is scientific and should thus be answer-
able to or at least in principle be able to be integrated with the other sciences,
70
4.2 Externalism and scientific explanations
or it is a hermeneutic theory and thus, as Lepore argues, it isn’t answerable to
and can remain impartial in regard to science. I argued in this book that exter-
nalist theories are indeed hermeneutic and thus are not explanatory theories in
the scientific sense.
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Language and scientific
explanation: Where does
semantics fit in?
This book discusses the two main construals of the explanatory goals of
semantic theories. The first understands semantic theories in terms of a
hermeneutic explanatory project, this is often referred to in philosophy of
language as externalism. This construal, often implicit, is the standard one
in linguistics, but it is far from being the only one. The second construal
understands semantic theories in terms of the internalist study of the cog-
nitive psychological mechanisms in virtue of which meaning production
and comprehension is made possible. This book compares the internalist
and externalist approach to semantics, describing their different motiva-
tions and theoretical assumptions. It is argued that a fruitful scientific ex-
planation is one that aims to uncover the underlying mechanisms in virtue
of which the observable phenomena are made possible, and that a scien-
tific semantics should be doing just that. If this is the case, then a science of
semantics is unlikely to be an externalist one based on hermeneutic and in-
terpretive principles, for reasons having to do with the subject matter and
form of externalist theories. Externalist explanations of meaning are con-
cerned with ascription and description of meaning rather than the mecha-
nisms of meaning. They are not concerned with the mental mechanisms in
virtue of which humans produce and comprehend meaning. Therefore, de-
spite the claims of leading externalists and formal semanticists to be doing
science, externalist explanations are not part of the cognitive psycholog-
ical explanation of the mechanisms in virtue of which meaning is made
possible. Rather, externalist explanations are a hermeneutic explanatory
project in that they are an inherently interpretive project. It is argued that
semantics construed hermeneutically is nevertheless a valuable explana-
tory project.
In regard to linguistic science and the way in which linguists think and
work, sorting out what the domain of a semantic theory is and what ex-
planatory goals it has are paramount in assessing the success or otherwise
of the theory.
